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Abstract 
The audit committee performs a very important role in corporate governance. The main 
objective of this research is to enhance the audit committee effectiveness through, a 
comparison between codes and regulations of the Audit Committee in the U.K., U.S.A. 
and Egypt. Such comparison will highlight important issues related to Audit Committee 
activities and will result in modification to the existing Egyptian Code of Corporate 
Governance for Audit Committee. The importance of the research comes from the fact 
that the Audit Committee report became mandatory starting from 2009 for all listed 
companies in the EGX. The study conducted analyzed requirement in the British UK 
Code, The AICPA Audit Committee Toolkit: Public Companies and other research. Four 
hypotheses were developed and tested to assess the effect of Audit Committee 
characteristics including establishment and role, resources, skills and experience, Audit 
Committee relation with Board of Directors, financial reporting, internal control, whistle-
blowing, internal audit function, external audit, annual audit cycle, and communication 
with shareholders on the effectiveness of the Audit Committee.  For this reason, a 
survey was conducted to analyze the opinion of professionals like AC members, 
Accountants and Auditors, and the scholars in the education field for the improvement 
of Audit Committee in Egypt Code of Corporate Governance. 
Once data were collected, they were analyzed with the statistical software SPSS for 
implication for Egypt Code of Corporate Governance for Audit Committee. The data 
subjected to statistical analysis and procedures, including descriptive statistics, 
frequencies, percentages, mean, correlations and coefficient of variation.  
The overall analysis of the data gathered was strongly supportive of the 4 hypotheses. 
The researcher reached a conclusion, referring that, the regulatory initiative has a 
strong impact on the development of the Corporate Governance Code to be more 
comprehensive and detailed, on the road, to a proactive and more effective Audit 
Committee, which will empower the local investment environment and sustain higher 
rates of economic growth. The researcher recommends the deployment of the proposed 
provisions by the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority with continuous review of the 
Corporate Governance regulations every three years to catch up with the latest 
developments relative to the issue. 1 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1-1 Research Questions 
The expansion in the business environment in Egypt coupled with the increase in the 
number of companies established raises the question; does the Egyptian Audit 
Committee (AC) Code need amendment, Although this code was adopted by the 
Capital Market Authority (CMA, now EFSA) fairly recently, in Sep. 22, 2008, it may be 
necessary to update the code to reflect the new mandatory AC report required of all 
listed companies starting from 2009. Egypt should arguably follow the path adopted in 
the US and UK of regularly updating its AC codes. Starting from 2004 US, regulatory 
bodies update the guidelines every year, while the UK prefers to do it whenever 
necessary, usually every two years. There is a need for development of Egypt AC code 
to consider all changes in the global economy and its effects on the Egyptian business  
environment. This may requires reform to the existing AC Code allowing more control 
over listed companies.  
The current research study will propose new requirements for AC Code for Egyptian 
listed companies to help them do a better job in monitoring and controlling their day-to-
day activities. The Egyptian government is working toward developing this sector and 
started by creating the Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIOD) in 2003 under the authority 
of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (this institute developed Egyptian Code of Corporate 
Governance for both the Private Sector and the Public Enterprise Sector in 2005 and 
2006). In addition, the improvement to the AC code will promote the trust of the 
international investment community and, ultimately, foreign direct and portfolio 
investment, which in turn, will result in gaining more credibility and more encouragement 
of investments.  
Finally, a more effective AC means more stability and resistance to economic shocks. 
The idea of having more investments in the economy to generate more jobs for the 
community is the main goal of the government and it is doing its best for attaining this 
end. A well built economic environment will be more mature to resist economic shocks 
than an infant one.     
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1-2 Research Objective 
The main objective of this research is to enhance the effectiveness of the Egyptian AC 
Code in terms of reliability, clarity, comprehensiveness, and practicality. The original 
Egyptian AC code was written in 2007 before the AC report was made mandatory for 
companies registered in the Egyptian stock market. Several changes have taken place; 
such as the Global Economic crisis and the consequences of the collapse of the various 
stock markets around the world. Facing these dramatic events the regulatory agency of 
CMA tried to empower the Egyptian economy against such drastic outcomes by 
empowering Corporate Governance (CG) through the use of the AC toll to protect 
investments in the country. Although the AC practice in Egypt is sti ll new, less than 3 
years, but that does not mean that its code should be very brief and rigid. The AC Code 
should give some examples and be a guideline to the practi tioners toward the easiest 
and best practice in the management of the listed companies and safeguarding their 
assets.      
The main objectives of the research are:  
1. Update the AC Code in Egypt. This should be of an ongoing process, based on 
best practice advice for updating the code with new regulations to be put in 
place. 
2. Develop the code to be more detailed. The AC Egyptian code is not more than 
one page; although it gives a starting point to the directors, still it is not enough 
for the complexity, size and volume of work of the required modern business 
environment.  
3. Empowering the local investment environment to grew to help unemployment in 
Egypt. Given the many financial problems facing developing countries, 
corporations need to have a rescue plan for the country‟s economy, and the AC 
code could be a vital element within such plan.   
4. Sustain high rates of Economic Growth. CG, in general, benefits developing 
economies in realizing sustainable rates of growth while maintaining the overall 
high growth.  
5. Help the ACs practitioners do a better Job. In the beginning of every discipline 
the practitioners will need to have as much help as they could get; they need to 
know where their jurisdiction starts and where it ends and how to do the job? 
Without providing a good guidance; high expectations should not be assumed to 
be realized, and the AC may not be able to set the company back on the right 
track.  
 
3 Chapter 1 
 
1-3 Literature Review  
1-3-1 Corporate Governance 
he importance of CG issues gained increased recognition after the scandal of 
Enron in 2002, due to the failure and violation of the trust embedded in business 
management of  some companies in the private and public sector. Many governments 
were surprised to see failures occurring in a well-organized corporation with the 
cooperation and knowledge of one of the best CPA firms in the world (i.e. Arthur 
Anderson). Due to this fact of dishonesty CG policy reforms were considered an 
important global policy issue driven by additional events like the Asian Financial Crises 
in 1997; and crises in Turkey and Argentina in 2001 and 2002. CG is seen as a safety 
net for most of the listed companies in the stock market during the era of continued 
financial crises.  
It is not a good idea to entrust CG to rich families, few powerful bankers or a cadre of 
bureaucrats and also this does not protect minority shareholders. Shareholders should 
always be able to sue the directors and officers of the company that violates the rules 
(Morck & Steier, 2007, pp. 5-7). This represents a CG challenge for many governments 
because the newness of this concept to many is made worse by confusion between two 
concepts, Governance and Control. The objective was to separate Control and 
Ownership. This will involve two rights, liability and continuity, the limited liability is that 
for every stock the owner is responsible to the value of her/his shares and no more than 
that if the corporation becomes insolvent. The continuity principle means that the assets 
of the corporation should live longer than any of its stakeholders (Naciri, 2008, p. 1). 
Any company is not more than a set of settled rules, regulating monetary and physical 
outputs it generates. It will not be more than a relation between governing 
establishments, the setters or programs and schemes to run the corporations, and 
those who are under their authority. The Board of Directors (BD) is the representative of 
all the Shareholders and must make sure that management of the company serves the 
stockholders‟ best interests (Naciri, 2008, p. 3). Corporations aim to maximize the 
wealth of shareholders. On the other hand, CG is seen as an important tool for 
controlling companies, CG framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the 
company, the effective monitoring of management by the BD, and the BD‟s 
accountability to the shareholders and the public (McGee, 2009, p. 49).  
Corporate Governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled… Boards of 
directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The shareholders’ role in 
governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an 
appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the 
company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the 
management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s 
T 
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actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting. (Sullivan, 2009, 
p. 9)  
The key stakeholders are shareholders, BD and the management. All of these are 
considered internal stakeholders, while on the other hand the company has external 
stakeholders like suppliers, banks (creditors), customers, etc. It is the responsibility of 
the BD to come up with CG administrative and policy procedures to ensure the 
protection of shareholders‟ rights and wealth. These procedures are usually put in a 
code or another document that has a synonymous name. This code will help the BD to 
add value to the company and of course to the interest of shareholders. Also it is the 
responsibility of the BD to make sure that everyone in the company is doing precisely 
her/his job. It is important to monitor the performance of the executive directors and 
branch managers especially in large companies that hire hundreds of employees, and 
at the same time, may spread over many countries around the world. So adding value 
will be through sound CG and this will help, on the long run, to create and shape the 
behavior and performance of the organization from top to bottom. CG will also affect the 
organization, not only from inside, but also on the outside with goodwill among the 
customers and business partners.   
CG is simply a method by which corporations are controlled and this tool will empower 
the BD in managing their responsibilities. While the Shareholders responsibility is to hire 
external auditors and CEO to ensure that a good structure is in place; the BD has to 
make sure that strategies are set forth and provided to the leadership to put them into 
action. At the same time, doing the supervision of the management and reporting to the 
shareholders on their stewardship will help in fighting corruption (Sullivan, 2009, p. 9).  
 In the last 10 years, Egypt has seen important efforts to align corporate financial 
reporting requirements with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
including all International Accounting Standards (IAS). Additional improvements could 
be accomplished by updating the legislative framework that includes an appropriate 
regulatory framework for practicing auditing and internal control toward a better and 
sounder CG practice (IFC, 2002, p. i). Egypt has taken a serious effort to be involved in 
the issue on the global level by considering participation in the S&P/IFC index1 and in 
the MSCI EMF index2. This will help Egypt over time to have regional and global 
indicators to measure the development of the CG in the country. 
1-3-2 Board of directors and Committees 
Coming back to the vast responsibility of the BD, and due to that, the BD depends on a 
number of committees to carry out its tasks. Following is a list of the most customary 
committees; 
                                                                 
1
 It intends  to project the performance of the Stock Market movements especially in the emerging markets .  
2
 It intends to project the measurement of equity-market performance in emerging markets.  
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1. Audit Committee (AC); 
2. Committee of outside Directors; 
3. Executive Committee; 
4. Finance Committee; 
5. HR and Compensation Committee; 
6. Nominating and Governance Committee; 
7. Remuneration Committee; 
8. Investment Committee;  
9. Risk Committee; and 
10. Environmental Committee. 
There could be other committees that reflect a specific industry or circumstances. 
The BD manages it work through properly constructed committees that divide the 
duties related to the various activities of the company and give the chance to the 
directors to use their maximum know-how. The entire BD cannot deal with every 
aspect, so it delegates certain issues to the relevant committees and then the issue 
after careful study and analysis return back to the BD for briefing and recommendation. 
Each committee must have a chart of duties. Their meeting and reports will become 
part of the BD‟s minutes (Colley, Logan, & Stettinius, 2003, p. 44). The shareholders 
committee‟s (annual meeting of shareholders) major work is to exercise control over the 
BD‟s main concern and structure. This will guarantee that it will, most of the time, 
handle issues which are suitable from the BD members‟ interests (Monks & Minow, 
2004, p. 186). Today we have guidelines for good CG that did not exist two decades 
ago and greater knowledge and willingness to engage in this good governance 
schema. The private sector should be a stakeholder in the process of building and 
supporting a reliable accountability and transparency structure that will prevent 
corruption and advocate sound CG. (Sullivan, 2009, pp. v-vi) 
A good CG Company could be seen to have the following characteristics; “  
 An absence of accounting problems.  
 Employee stock option plans that are aligned with the best interests of 
shareholders; 
 Executive compensation plans that do not divert value from shareholders; 
 BD that are not dominated by shareholders who own large blocks of stock; and 
 Ensuring that management is pursuing a sound overall business strategy”. 
(Duffy, 2004, p. 45) 
A good and sound CG performance will, in the near future, attract more investments 
due to the management enhanced and improved capacities, and may result in, 
reduction in the risk factor associated with financial and administrative elements. This is 
considered important in the developing countries because more investments means 
more services, innovation and more technology. If fully implemented by the country‟s 
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private sector, sound CG could serve the well-being of the country even with minimum 
intervention of the governments. It also means that the political administration would 
focus more on control rather than running the business, „hitting two birds with one 
stone.‟  
1-3-3-1 Audit Committee 
AC has a significant focus on the financial affairs of the company and helps to satisfy 
the demand for corporate accountability. AC is considered an important tool in the 
conduct of corporate business. If the AC would identify any financial mismanagement, 
like embezzlement, some people may end up in jail even if they were directors (Ward, 
2000, p. 44). AC is the last safe haven for sound financial practice in each corporation. 
AC will help companies navigate the minefields of corporate corruption.  
An Audit Committee is Defined by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; 2002 as: 
(A) a committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the BD of an issuer for the 
purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting processes of the issuer
3
 and 
audits of the financial statements of the issuer; and  
(B) If no such committee exists with respect to an issuer, the entire BD of the issuer. 
Braiotta (2004) indicates that the AC play a critical role in today‟s CG by assisting the 
BD with the maintenance and development of the corporate accountability framework. 
The AC makes BD accountable for its stewardship accountability. Copnell (2005) adds 
that AC fulfils its fiduciary responsibility according to the AC mission, abilities of AC 
members and the tone set at the top of the governance structure. It is represented by 
the fiduciary feature that the AC has from the BD and Shareholders. Constructing an AC 
will involve BD in the financial process and eventually will help the BD to apply 
extensive and larger control over management.  
The focus on improving CG should be a continuous improvement process. The 
corporations should implement procedures and policies that guarantee the effectiveness 
of each CG tool. The business should always concentrate on enhancing the internal 
control and financial disclosure for a better CG. (Carpenter, Fennema, Fretwell, & 
Hillison, 2004, p. 63). The quality of CG and the effectiveness of BD are critical 
elements to an organizational success (Duffy, 2004, p. 43). AC that operates 
successfully is a key feature in a strong CG culture and can bring major benefits to the 
organization (Copnell, 2005, p. 7).  
The AC forms an important requirement of Egypt CG code. AC was formally required for 
all listed companies in Egypt beginning 2008 by CMA now the Egyptian Financial 
Supervisory Authority (EFSA) (CMA BD Decision No. (94) of 2008 issued on 22/9/2008; 
AC was mentioned in article 7). At the beginning of 2009 all listed companies on the 
Egyptian Exchange (EGX) have to submit the AC report starting from the first quarter of 
                                                                 
3
 The company that issues financial statement.  
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2009 (ending March 31) and the companies that did not submit the AC report by the two 
months deadline were required to pay a fine of LE 15,000.  
1-3-3-2 Audit Committee Members, Roles, Responsibilities and financial 
Expertise Considerations. 
AC team should not be less than 3 members and no more than 6, one of them at least 
should possess financial expertise and the others should be financially literate. All the 
members should have integrity, objectivity, confidence and informed judgment. The AC 
size depends on the field or/and the kind of industry.  
The AC should ensure the achievements of the following:  
“ 
1. Integrity of the company‟s financial statements. 
2. Internal control over the financial reporting process 
3. CPA firm‟s qualifications, independence, and performance  
4. Performance of the internal audit function 
5. Compliance with legal and regulatory requirements”. (AICPA, 2009, p. 7) 
Among the roles and responsibilities of the AC, the following represent the major 
responsibilities:   
1. Ensuring that the organization has antifraud programs and controls in place to 
help prevent, deter, and detect fraud. The AC improves internal control that acts 
as an effective monitoring device for enhancing disclosure quality with more 
reliable financial reporting.  
2. Ensure that financial statements are reliable, transparent and understandable.  
3. Ensure that the organization has implemented an effective ethics and compliance  
program, and guidelines for acceptable behavior, on which a climate of integrity 
is built and well established.  
4. Establish procedures for the reporting of complaints.  
5. Conducting AC Executive sessions with various members of the executive 
management and reviewing executive expenses.  
6.  Selecting, evaluating and replacing the CPA firm subject to BD and/or 
shareholders approval.  
7. Reviewing in a timely manner all annual and interim financial statements.  
8. Ensuring the compliance with all laws and regulations that have a significant 
impact on financial statements.  
(Colley, Logan, & Stettinius, 2003, p. 51), (AICPA, 2008, pp. 56,59,67), (Braiotta, 
2004, p. 45), (Dahawy & Samaha, 2009, p. 13). 
All the above responsibilities and procedures should be written down in the AC Charter 
to make sure that the AC members are aware and committed to the job. AC should be 
accountable to all shareholders, which includes proper stewardship to the resources of 
the company. AC should have the independence necessary to safeguard the credibility 
of the organization, which includes the independence of the committee members. As a 
prerequisite to the effective performance of the AC, the BD should formulate a clear 
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definition of the AC‟s authority. A strong internal audit function begins with a strong  AC. 
It should define the purpose of the charter: to help the BD fulfill its oversight 
responsibilities with a detailed description of the authority of AC (Harrington, 2004, p. 
69).  
1-4 Development of CG in Egypt: Past 
& Future 
In the late 1990s, Egypt recognized the importance and need of gaining trust of the 
foreign direct investments, portfolio investors, and the international community 
generally. It started applying a well-tailored economic reform program, a part of which 
was privatization (Dahawy & Samaha, 2009, p. 5). The Egypt economy is now mixed 
market-based, in which the entire government disbursement is moderate. Government 
spending in recent years was 33.6% of GDP and policies have been adopted to 
encourage foreign investments. Limitations remain, however: procedures for allowing 
foreign investments requires approval by a ministry, most foreign ownership of land is 
prohibited, and there are no tax incentives for foreign investment. But Egypt has 
lowered all taxes to promote global capital investments. Property rights and contracts 
are protected, but the proposal associated with the purchase of real estate is complex. 
The judicial process is costly, lengthy, and subject to political pressures, Egypt's ranking 
is 115th out of 180 countries in Transparency International's 2008 Corruption 
Perceptions Index (eStandardsForum, 2009, p. 2). Egypt maintained the same ranking 
in 2009.  
Moving steadily, since 2002, Egypt‟s government has promoted reforms that have had a 
major positive influence on transparency and fiscal policy. With the appointment of a 
new Prime Minister in 2004, the pace of such reforms has increased in most areas, 
although there has been some slow-down in initiatives, particularly in the economic 
sector (eStandardsForum, 2009, p. 4).  
The enforcement and implementation of the CG rules remained weak, however. 
Legislative reforms are needed in order to bring the policy framework into better 
conformity with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development of CG 
Principles. Following the World Bank's recommendations, the Egyptian Code of CG was 
published in 2005 by EIOD (eStandardsForum, 2009, p. 5). CG helps in realizing 
sustainable and high rates of growth, enhances confidence in the local capital market, 
increases and deepens the ability of the market to mobilize saving, encourages growth 
of the private sector by supporting its competitive capabilities, helps to secure financing 
for projects, generates profits and creates job opportunities (Dahawy & Samaha, 2009, 
p. 3). Improvements are required in the areas of fiscal data timeliness and quality, and 
public confidence in the reliability of fiscal and budget data remains low. The IMF's 2008 
Consultations report notes that Egypt's reform efforts are hindered by current global 
economic conditions, but the IMF urges that efforts continue, particularly citing the need 
to move forward (eStandardsForum, 2009, p. 4).  
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The prevalence of family-owned businesses and high ownership concentration in many 
emerging markets mean that public disclosure is less advanced because insiders are 
closely informed about the company‟s activities and financial position  (Ghazali & 
Weetman, 2006, p. 28). Family-controlled organizations have no motivation to disclose 
information in the absence of obligatory requirements because the demand for public 
disclosure is relatively weak in comparison with companies that have diverse ownership 
(Chau & Gray, 2002, p. 250). Firms with a high representation of family members on BD 
are likely to be less diffused in terms of ownership. Incentives to disclose additional 
information are expected to be less, given the low degree of conflict of interests 
(Ghazali & Weetman, 2006, p. 233). There is a need for a proper design of CG features 
that can protect the rights of minority shareholders in developing economies (Ghazali & 
Weetman, 2006, p. 228). A key player in this construction is the non-executive director 
that is a BD member who is not involved in the management of the firm and does not 
have any direct or indirect interest in the firm (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006, p. 234). 
Outside directors who are less aligned to management may encourage or require 
companies to disclose more information to outside investors; there is a positive relation 
between proportion of independent directors and voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak, 
2003, p. 331). 
 
Nonexecutive independent directors would help in more effective monitoring of the BD 
and limit managerial opportunism. A complementary relationship would mean a greater 
extent of disclosure by companies with a higher proportion of independent directors on 
the BD (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006, p. 233). Consequently, when an AC code is 
developed; this will empower the non-executive directors to do a better job in serving 
the purpose of all the shareholders.  
Egypt does not have detailed regulations comparable to those in the US, such as, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which for example, prohibits auditing/accounting firms 
from simultaneously providing both consulting and auditing services to the same client. 
It also promotes some disclosure practices that are not common in the Middle East, 
such as whistle-blowing protection, takeovers provisions…etc. So procedures and 
measures related to these items are not commonly disclosed in the region. The 
voluntary disclosure of information in the local market is far from satisfactory at the  
current status quo, such that insufficient data is available in the firms‟ financial reports 
(Dahawy & Samaha, 2009, pp. 24,32,33).  
 
“In emerging capital markets, where the level of information asymmetry appears to be 
greater than in developed markets, investors may be discouraged by perceptions of 
unfair trading. In many developing countries the accounting profession is not in a 
position to regulate accounting and financial reporting effectively. Consequently, it may 
not be sensible to depend on professional self-regulation and the regulation of 
accounting by an independent authoritative body, while the establishment of accounting 
principles and the supervision of their application throughout the economy should be 
given serious consideration in the public interests. However, governments may be 
subject to a failure of political will or may lack the resources to enforce standards; some 
argue that even where compliance with standards is legally required, companies may 
not comply if it is perceived that the consequences of not-compliance are not serious. 
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The intervention of governments in developing countries through accounting and 
disclosure standards may be essential to ensure higher reliability of financial reports” 
(Samaha & Stapleton, 2008, pp. 44,61). This may lead to the enforcement of AC by 
EGX.  
 
The enforcement and implementation of CG rules remains weak. The best practice 
report of Egypt 2009 recommended building institutional capacity to ensure efficient 
regulation of the market and strong enforcement of rules. This voluntary code is an 
addition to the corporate-related provisions stated under various laws 
(eStandardsForum, 2009, p. 5). With the enforcement of the AC regulation in early 2009 
on all the listed companies in EGX; it is necessary to develop the code to be more 
helpful for the ACs the companies in the local capital stock market.  
 
1-5 Research Methodology  
In order to achieve the objective of this research, the study will be conducted in two 
stages; 
1. A theoretical study for analyzing the components of both the American and the 
British AC codes to seek means of improvements of the Egyptian Code. The 
study will focus on the AC code for companies listed in the stock market. The 
American AC Toolkit has four categories, each for a different kind of organization 
in the economy, while the Egyptian has only one for both listed and unlisted 
companies. The special condition of Egypt, the legal and regulatory parameters, 
will be considered for the adaption of the code proposed modifications.   
2. A field study will be undertaken using a questionnaire to analyze and survey a 
sample of the AC chairmen and members for large corporations in Egypt. The 
aim of the questionnaire is to assess the perception of the AC teams for the 
proposed modifications and changes on the Egyptian code in relation to AC. The 
survey will also try to find the best way to develop the code in a way that will be a 
„friendly use document‟ for all the AC members in embarking their duties and to 
help in developing a useful tool for the next few years . 
Like many other countries in the world, Egypt is promoting a reliable investing 
environment and Egypt‟s AC Code will need to adopt the rapid changes in the CG 
literature and implement the evolving practice. This research is undertaken to 
consider the latest changes and updates in the UK CG code concentrating the AC 
part of that code with comparison with the AC toolkit in the US. The current research 
will propose modifications into the Egyptian AC Code to enhance its 
understandability, cohesiveness, completeness and its application in practice. The 
issues critical to the enhancement of the CG practice in Egypt and useful for the 
local environment will be proposed for adoption.  
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After examining the three codes and proposing modifications to bring the Egyptian 
AC code up to global standards, the research will assess opinions and critics of the 
professionals in the Egyptian market. A survey will be conducted among academics 
and practitioners to collect the practical opinions of the auditors in CPA firms and AC 
members in big listed companies about the recommended changes and 
improvements to the local AC code. After completing data gathering, analysis of the 
points made by the participants will shape a final set of recommendations to update 
the Egyptian AC code.  
 
1-6 The structure of the Research 
This research contains five chapters;  
Chapter One; is an introductory chapter presenting the foundation of the thesis and 
the importance to the Corporate Governance, with the focus on the AC role in this 
matter. 
Chapter Two; Literature Review of Audit Committee; the requirements of Corporate 
Governance Code in U.K, U.S.A and Egypt. This chapter will be a comprehensive 
review of the two codes, which would help to improve AC Code in Egypt.   
Chapter Three; Proposed Improvement for AC requirements in Egypt. This chapter 
will help to fulfill the objectives of the current research by developing a potential list of 
modifications to the Egyptian Code to enhance understanding of the code by the 
practitioners.      
Chapter Four; Data analysis and findings. This chapter will seek the opinions of a 
sample of the AC teams that have some experience and practice, in this locally new 
field, to see their perception about the proposed modifications and additions proposed 
to the code.   
Chapter Five; Conclusions, limitations and recommendations.  
 
Summary. 
This chapter is an introductory chapter. In the problem statement, the researcher identified 
the main objectives and benefits related to the development of the AC Code. The 
researcher then presented the details about the issue by reviewing first development in 
CG and its importance in sustaining good growth rates, with much focus on the relation 
between CG and AC. A definition of AC and details about its roles and responsibilities 
were presented. The chapter also included a review of CG in Egypt, the methodology that 
will be followed to achieve the study objectives, and the structure of the research.  
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Chapter 2: literature Review of 
Audit Committee; the Requirements 
of Corporate Governance Code in 
U.K, U.S.A and Egypt.                
 
2-1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the researcher will examine the CG codes in the three countries, namely 
the USA, UK and Egypt. The research will focus on the requirements of the AC 
provisions. Shareholders depend on the BD and its AC to oversee company 
performance and take decisions that serve the best interests of the company and its 
shareholders. A CPA firm following best practices helps the BD and AC fulfill their CG 
responsibilities and serve the public interest (Glazer & Fabian, 1997, p. 96). 
The tone of a company's control environment is set at the top, by the BD in general and 
the AC in particular. The responsibility of the BD often relies on the AC to question and 
notice any unusual business practices, aggressive accounting methods or violations of 
the company's code of business conduct (Bean Jr., 1999, p. 47). The right tone should 
be relevant to the firm‟s structure, size and stakeholders. It is the responsibility of the 
AC chairman to set the right tone at the top.  The AC is created by the BD to play a vital 
role in the CG process, which aims to protect the shareholders interests. There should 
be some requirements that will help the AC to do the job and achieve excellent 
performance through the control over the company‟s operations.  
This chapter begins with a description of how the UK AC Code is designed and what 
issues it discusses, then the US code and toolkit will be discussed in details. Finally, the 
Egyptian code will be analyzed with the aim to identify areas that are not in alignment 
with best practice as represented by the US and UK codes. 
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2-2 The  characteristics of UK Audit 
Committee Code 
The UK AC Code is composed of the „Guidance on Audit Committees‟ published in 
October 2008 by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). Earlier, in July 2003, the same 
guidance, was part of the CG Code, called then „The Smith Guidance‟, then the name 
changed when updated in October 2005 to „Guidance on Audit Committees (The Smith 
Guidance).‟  
The UK Code is one of the most comprehensive and detailed codes for an AC that 
could be found in a capital market. The AC part of the Code is comprehensive in 
presenting methods it follows in explaining every issue it goes through. In addition the 
FRC adds and updates its provisions every 2 years, which make it a living document 
that accommodate changes in business and political environment and all other 
economic changes. It responds to the major elements that take place in the normal 
cycle of business in the UK taking into consideration that the London Stock Exchange is 
one of the largest Capital Market in the world.  
The guide is composed of five Parts with an appendix.  
1. Introduction; 
2. Establishment and role of the audit committee; membership, procedures and 
resources; 
3. Relationship with the BD; 
4. Role and responsibilities; and  
5. Communication with shareholders. 
The introduction identifies the objective of the code to assist the BD in making apt 
arrangements for the AC and helping the directors working in the AC. The BD should 
determine the AC particular characteristics concerning the risk profile, complexity and 
the size of the company. The AC members should act independently, not like other 
directors, to make sure that the interests of the shareholders are protected. The 
introduction also recommends procedures to be followed by members to solve the 
disagreements that may take place between the AC and BD. It also empowers the AC 
to be able to do a better job for the company.  Moreover, the Code explains the relation 
among the AC and the management, external and internal auditors especially that all 
parties should have a free access to the AC with regard to information. It requires the 
management to take the lead and give information to the committee without necessarily 
being asked.  The internal control is one of the main issues on which the AC should 
maintain oversight, review and assesses, because the AC will intervene if they find that 
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something is wrong. In addition, many other things are covered, like the scope and time 
of the AC activity, with the need for training for AC members.  
The second part of the code clarifies the Establishment and role of the AC; 
membership, procedures and resources. It begins with Establishment and role of AC, 
given by the BD to the committee, to be able to do its job. To achieve this objective, the 
Code explains the audit process including monitoring and reviewing the financial 
statements and financial reporting; monitoring the internal auditors; AC‟s remuneration, 
independence and appointment of CPA firm; policies for non-audit services.  Another 
issue is the membership and appointment of AC. the Code includes the following: AC 
should have 3 independent members (non-executives), the number of AC members and 
appointing a chairman, which focuses also on the AC members independence with 
emphasis on accounting literacy of at least one member; the determination of maximum 
time the member could serve in an AC.  Another important issue is meetings of AC, 
which includes: how many meetings per year; who will attend the meetings of AC; time 
for and between the meetings of BD and AC; meeting with internal auditors and meeting 
the CPA firm at least annually; conducting formal meeting of the AC and maintain an 
ongoing contact with key people.  Resources are also important concerning sufficiency; 
assistance; free access to information and acquiring independent advisors. 
Remuneration for AC is another vital issue. Skills, experience and training is an integral 
part of the skills of AC members which includes: financial qualification for the expert; 
orientation for new members and continuous training for all AC members. 
The third part of the UK Code overviews the Relationship with the BD and includes the 
following: The extent of the AC authorities delegated by BD; AC responsibilities; self 
evaluation; and disagreement between BD & AC. The fourth part of the code includes 
the role and responsibilities of the following: the First section discusses the financial 
reporting, including: AC reviews of financial reporting and the financial statements; the 
AC have to check if accounting policies are appropriate and report that to the BD. In 
addition, the AC should review the information in the financial statements. Internal 
controls and risk management systems is the second section of this part, which 
includes: reviewing the internal financial controls and risk management; assessment 
and management of risk and assessing management effectiveness; and approving the 
annual report. The third part covers Whistle-blowing and gives a short explanation of it.  
The part of the internal audit process emphasizes on the issue of the need for an 
internal audit function or not. This is the main issue in most of the sections of this part 
and the evaluation of the company‟s need for such a function and what should be done 
if the company does not have an internal audit function. This part is not compatible with 
the Egyptian code because the EGX mandate an internal audit function on all the listed 
companies. The Code also explains the characteristics of internal audit regarding the 
size and complexity of the company; approving the appointment of Chief Audit 
Executive (CAE); and that the AC should review the work of internal auditor.  
 The fifth part is concerned with the external audit process. The AC Code described the 
nature of involvement of the AC with the CPA firm; the hiring and firing of CPA firm and 
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the selection process with the  assessment of the CPA firm; reporting all these issues to 
the BD. The AC has the responsibility to approve the terms and remuneration of the 
CPA firm, also the AC has to assess its independence, including the provisions of non-
audit services; verifying former CPA firm employees as an important resource to the 
company; check the compliance to ethical standards by the CPA firm; and prohibited 
non-audit services and reporting about them, although, this code did not go into non-
audit services details.  This section also includes annual audit cycle which explains 
planning; scope and appropriateness of the CPA firm; also the importance of joint 
review between the AC and the CPA firm to those controls, review of the audit 
representation letter and management letter; and evaluation of the audit process. 
Finally; Communication with shareholders explains reporting the AC responsibilities in 
the proxy statement with details to guide management in the application of such 
concept and the need for AC chairman to attend the Annual General Meeting (AGM).  
The APPENDIX revises guidance on use of firms from more than one network. This 
issue is beyond the scope of this thesis so the research will not go into details on this 
issue.  
   
2-3 The US Toolkit and Code 
2-3-1 The AICPA Audit Committee Toolkit; Public Companies.   
The toolkit is published by the AICPA and is revised on an annual basis starting from 
2003, a matter which makes it an important document for the purposes of this research. 
The Toolkit includes the following chapters: 
1. AC administration; 
2. Key Responsibilities; 
3. Performance Evaluation; and 
4. Other Tools. 
The 1st chapter discusses AC member Roles and Responsibilities, which describes: the 
minimum number of AC and the necessity of involving a financial expert, AC process 
and procedures with oversight on financial reporting process and the audit functions 
taking into account the limitation of the AC role. The AC charter Matrix, the 2nd part, 
shows the best practice which is useful to manage the agenda of AC members. It is also 
a very useful manual tool to be followed by AC when planning. The 3rd part of the 
chapter, the AC financial expert decision tree includes a flowchart that could help in 
evaluating the candidates for the Financial Expert position. The 4th part is a Sample 
Request for proposal letter for CPA services. The 5th part of the chapter reviews the AC 
role in AICPA Peer Reviews and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) Inspections of CPA Firms: An Overview assessing the CPA performance to 
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help the AC members in understanding the oversight and obligations of CPA firms. This 
part deals with the Guidelines for Hiring the CAE, stressing the importance of the 
internal Auditor and the  special care to be taken to hire the head of the function. This 
part sheds light on this issue by explaining the expertise, qualifications and experience 
for this position. The last part of the 1st chapter deals with Engaging Independent 
Counsel and Other Advisers which explains the different quali fications of each adviser 
for different tasks and provides a good guide for screening. 
Chapter 2 titled Key responsibilities includes: Internal Control: A Tool for the AC which 
contains a through explanation about the basics of Internal Control and the key terms in 
internal control over financial reporting. This part also explains the roles and 
responsibilities of key executives and other personnel in the internal control. It also 
gives an idea of what internal control cannot do; for example, some focus was put on 
management override of controls and ways of fraud. This section concludes with the 
importance of overview of internal control to AC members, and highlights the role of the 
AC in establishing an appropriate control environment. The 2nd part of the chapter, 
Fraud and the Responsibilities of the AC: An Overview, emphasizes that AC should 
insure that the company has the right programs to identify and categorize potential fraud 
which mandates the AC to handle the prevention, deterrence, investigation and 
discovery or detection of fraud. This could be done by using the expertise of Forensic 
Accounting Consultants. The AC should play a leading role in preventing fraud and 
should help to provide all the necessary tools to fight fraud. The 3rd part deals with the 
Procedures for Handling Complaints (Whistleblower Policy) and includes a Tracking 
Report that help in establishing a process for reporting the complaints to ensure proper 
internal control procedures for handling employee complaints, director complaints, and 
other complaints. This part of the chapter also explained how to process and retain 
complaints with maximum period of five years. The chapter includes also Issues Report 
from Management, a tool for documenting any critical issue to discuss with the AC. The 
5th part of this chapter is Conducting an AC Executive Session: Guidelines and 
Questions, which offers guidance for meeting different key executives or management 
teams on a one-on-one basis. It contains a definition of what is an executive session 
and an identification of the executives as the following: Chief Financial Officer (CFO), 
CEO, CAE, Chief Information Officer (CIO) and General Counsel. This tool also 
includes CPA firms; a part on discussions to expect from the Independent Auditor which 
helps to establish better communication between the AC and the CPA firm. It also 
includes: the element of independence for the CPA firm against the issuer, and the 
Auditor‟s Responsibility under the Standards of the PCAOB mandates for listed CPA 
firms with PCAOB. All practices and audit adjustments that take place should be 
reported to the AC by the CPA firm. Auditor‟s Judgments about the Quality of Entity‟s 
Accounting Principles, and Other Information Contained in Annual Report to 
Shareholders, disagreements with management and significant difficulties encountered 
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in performing the audit by CPA firm, consultation with other accountants, major issues 
discussed with management prior to retention and i llegal acts like fraud that place  
responsibilities on the CPA firm to make sure that AC has adequate information about. 
The last part of this chapter, SOX Section 404: Responding to the Identification of a 
Material Weakness- A Checklist for the AC, discusses the case of adverse audit reports.  
Chapter 3 of the Audit Tool analyzes criteria for Performance Evaluation. It includes 
Evaluating the Internal Audit Team: Guidelines and Questions those which will help the 
AC in evaluating the internal audit function of the company. It focuses on the AC 
Relationship with the Internal Audit Team who is the ears and eyes for the AC function. 
This part sheds light on Internal Auditing Standards and Quality Assessment through 
standards established by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA).  The second part of the 
chapter is about Evaluating the Independent Auditor: Questions to Consider and 
presents some measurement tools to assess how much independent is the AC toward 
the CPA firm. The last part of chapter 3 addresses Conducting an AC Self-Evaluation: 
Guidelines and Questions. This should be done on annual basis to measure the 
effectiveness of the AC work done.   
Chapter 4: Other Tools, describes Enterprise Risk Management: A Primer on the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) Framework and puts much attention 
on the SOX Section 404 requirements‟ and mandates. Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM) systems always focus on the prevention of losses of companies‟ assets which 
could be the result of situations when the company is not effectively handling risk well, 
this part gives an overview to the BD on ERM; while the next part, Enterprise Risk 
Management: A Tool for Strategic Oversight, provides questions to evaluate the ERM 
process and the search for any weaknesses. The next part of the chapter deals with 
Common Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) Filings. It provides AC members 
with an overview of SEC forms and terms necessary for reporting requirements . The 
fourth part of this chapter, titled SEC Final Rule on AC Financial Experts, provides a 
detailed definition of the expert and includes a number of expert characteristics, such 
as:  
1. Title which argues that it is not the matter of the term itself but the features that 
the expert possesses;  
2. Need to report the names and number of AC members;  
3. Need to disclose independence of AC financial expert(s),  
4. Definition of AC financial expert provides the attributes of them; 
5. Safe harbor from liability for AC financial experts; explains the aims to distinguish 
between experts and non experts for the purpose of disclosure; 
6. Determination of a person‟s status as an AC financial expert proposes that BD is 
the right body to make this determination;   
7. Location of AC financial expert disclosure in the proxy statement; and  
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8. Change in Item Number which is relevant only to the use of US listed companies.  
The last part of the US toolkit is the Resources of ACs, which provides members of the 
AC with tools to improve the skills including websites, data, information and ways to 
develop AC members‟ skills.  
 
2-3-2 The Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules.  
 This code was developed by the New York Stock Exchange and was approved by SEC 
on Nov. 4, 2003. This research will concentrate only on the part of the code that deals 
with AC. This code, unlike the British code, is not very comprehensive. The AC part is 
only four pages. It consists of the followings main provisions: Listed companies must 
have an AC that satisfies the requirements of Rule 10A-3 under the Exchange Act aimed 
to ensure the independence of directors and to strengthen CG practices of listed 
companies. The AC must have a minimum of three members and considers the financial 
literacy of the members and take into consideration the number of companies that an AC 
member could serve in at the same time.  In addition to any requirement of Rule 10A-3(b) 
(1), all AC members must satisfy the requirements for independence set out in Section 
303A.02. This part of the code deals with the transition period to comply with the 
requirement of the AC members and also set up AC members appointment, 
independence and compensation. The AC must have a written charter that addresses the 
AC‟s purpose which include the AC report, financial statements integrity, compliance with 
regulations, the CPA firm auditors qualifications and the evaluation of internal auditors; 
preparing the AC report; and AC responsibilities. Another part of this code is the annual 
evaluation of AC and the peer review of CPA firms. This part also emphasizes the 
rotation of the CPA firm lead auditor. The part titled discussion between AC and 
management for the annual and interim financial statements discusses the company‟s 
policy of income press releases explaining the information concerning types of disclosure 
and that this issue should not be done in advance. Another part of the US Code 
discusses the policies of risk management with the management of the company 
concerning policies and guidelines that govern the issue of risk that could be handled in 
some company through other mechanisms other than the AC. The next part addresses 
the need to Meet separately, periodically, with management, with internal auditors (or 
other personnel responsible for the internal audit function) and with CPA firm clarifies that 
the AC must meet all and each in a separate session. The next part, Review with the 
independent auditor any audit problems or difficulties and management’s response, asks 
that the AC regularly review difficulties encountered by the CPA firm, e.g. the scope of 
work or the access to information; and discusses the tasks, staffing and budget of internal 
audit team. Another part of this Code is to Set clear hiring policies for employees or 
former employees of the CPA firm because they could be a valuable addition to the 
company‟s management. The part titled Report regularly to the BD indicates that the AC 
must review: accounting principles, significant changes to accounting procedures, special 
audit steps, any analysis prepared by management, outcomes if different GAAP 1 
methods were used and the style of presenting the information. The last part in this Code 
                                                                 
1
 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.  
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emphasize the role of AC for listed company as Each listed companies must have an 
internal audit function to provide AC and management with ongoing evaluation of internal 
control, which indicated the necessity for the existence internal audit function.  
 
2-4 The Egyptian Code   
The country started to develop a CG code only in 2005; the following are the two CG 
codes that are now available in Arabic and English: 
a) “Guide to Corporate Governance Principles in Egypt” by Dr. Zeyad Bahaa El 
Din and Mr. Maged Shawqi, 2005, published by the Center for International 
Private Enterprise (CIPE). 
b)  "" , by the Capital 
Market Authority, Nov. 2006.  
 
Both codes are not more than 14 pages for each, as a result; the AC section in both is 
not more than a page. The most important elements discussed in the codes in relation 
to AC are: The AC should be comprised from non-executive BD members but with a 
minimum of three, with an option of hiring members from outside of the company. There 
should be at least one member as a financial expert.  The General Assembly should 
issue, upon a recommendation from the BD, a manual for hiring AC members and 
determine their duration, responsibilities and remuneration.  The management should 
provide AC with all available resources and help to conduct its responsibilities including 
appointment of external advisors and counsels.  
The AC functions as stated in the Egyptian Code are as follows: 
a) Assess the effectiveness of controller and her/his staff;  
b) Review the accounting policies and make comments and recommendations to BD;  
c) Be aware of all the advancements in the accounting field and report what could be 
of useful importance to the BD; 
d) Examine the internal control framework and write down a recommendation report 
with the necessary amendments to guarantee its ongoing effectiveness; 
e) Discuss and review internal audit function plans and efficiency;  
f) Review the internal control report and follow up the correcting actions of the joint 
comments; 
g) Recommend the appointment, dismissal and remuneration of the CPA firm to the 
BD; taking into account auditor‟s independence, qualifications and performance; 
putting in place assuring measurements to the ongoing independence of CPA firm;  
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h) Approve CPA firm‟s other non-audit services engagement and remuneration;  
i) Review the audit plan for the CPA firm and make comments;  
j) Review the financial statements draft before sending financial statements to the BD 
for approval and for the CPA firm to audit; 
k) Assess CPA firm remarks on the financial statements and discuss it with it and 
follow up the actions taken concerning the comments and qualifications; and  
l) Work on resolving all disagreement between management and CPA firm.  
 
The AC should have periodic meeting at least every three months with a specific 
agenda. It should prepare a periodic report, every three months, about the AC 
performance to the BD.   
In sum, one may notice that the content of the CG Code in relation to the AC did not 
include many of the responsibilities and elements which are associated with AC 
function. For example, the Egyptian AC did not include remuneration, non-audit 
services, Whistle-Blowing, etc.  
                                                       Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discussed the AC Codes in three 
countries. The introduction part tried to illustrate this 
idea by discussing the UK and US Codes and 
regulations in details and then analyzed the AC Code 
in Egypt. The chapter then explained in details the UK 
AC Code and discussed the AC Toolkit and Code in 
the USA. All the above analysis formed the preliminary 
detailed analysis needed to identify those provisions 
that can be added to Egypt AC Code for the 
improvement of AC role. 
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Chapter 3: Proposed Improvement 
for AC Requirements in Egypt. 
 
  
3-1 Introduction  
The aim of proposing development in Egypt AC Code is to help the listed companies in 
the EGX to better understand the role of ACs and the benefits that listed companies 
may receive from having an effective AC. The Egyptian Code for CG lacks many 
provisions that are considered necessary and important for the overall improvement of 
CG practice in Egypt’s business environment.  
 
The objective of this study is to recommend updating of the Egyptian Code  to ensure 
effective cooperation among the members of the AC and with other BD members and 
the management of the company. Moreover, this guidance will improve the attitude and 
working relations with the independent auditor1. This will give a clearer idea for the role 
of all parties involved with the work of the AC; to be aware of the road map when 
dealing with the AC, which information required from the management to the AC. 
 
Today, ACs are being asked to assume responsibilities well beyond their traditional 
duties (Copnell, 2005, p. vii). This requires an accurate system for handling day-to-day 
monitoring. The AC’s job is to provide oversight, review and assesses many of the 
elements constituting a company and controlling systems. The AC has to intervene 
when there is something of serious concern in the financial reporting process or 
management control system, and thus there should be enough resources to carry out 
the work of the AC. There should be suitable payment for AC members because the 
committee is giving valuable time to do the job (FRC, 2008, p. 4). 
 
This research analyzes and assesses the content of the combined code in the UK and 
make a comparison with that applied in Egypt. The British AC Code emphasizes the 
establishment of the committee and how the members are appointed. The Code 
                                                                 
1
 External Auditor, Independent Auditor or CPA firm refer to the same thing for the purpose of this research.  
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identifies the role of the AC and explains the responsibilities and different tasks the AC 
should undertake including membership, appointment, independence and duration of 
AC members. The meetings of the AC focused on the time and frequency of meetings 
and who should attend them; where resources include the kind of assistance and 
information the AC could have, and remuneration of the members. In addition, the AC 
members should have the skills, experience and training required to fulfi ll their job 
effectively. The code also concentrates on the Relationship with BD concerning the 
volume of tasks and responsibilities taken by AC, their evaluation and the disagreement 
between AC & BD. The AC should carry out its responsibility according to best practice, 
which included financial reporting, internal controls and risk management systems, 
whistle-Blowing, the internal audit process and the external audit process. The last part 
of the code dealt with the communication with shareholders by providing information 
about the tasks of AC, names of members, qualification and the way AC discharged its 
responsibilities.  
On the other hand, the US toolkit emphasized the AC Members Roles and 
Responsibilities, which explain the different tasks of AC work such as the oversight of 
financial reporting and audit function. The toolkit included an important part on engaging 
independent counsel and other advisers dealing with getting extra help from outside 
advisers to AC. The US toolkit also discusses the internal control needed to assist the 
AC to enhance the effective use of internal control and ways to maintain risk of fraud. 
Procedures for Handling Complaints (Whistleblower Policy) and Tracking Report  
focused on how the AC should review and handle complaints received by the company; 
Conducting an AC Executive Session: Guidelines and Questions , is a section in the 
toolkit, explained one of the core responsibilities of the AC and what should be done 
and who should attend its meetings; with the evaluation of the Internal Audit Team. 
Guidelines and Questions helped in the evaluation of the effectiveness of internal 
control; and the evaluation of the Independent Auditor, which provided guidelines for 
assessing the performance of CPA firm; Conducting an AC Self-Evaluation.  
Listed companies under the US Code must have an AC as it is a mandatory 
requirement by the NYSE. Moreover, the AC must have a minimum of three members, 
which includes also the required qualifications of those members like the financial 
literacy. In addition, the AC must have a written charter, which identifies the 
responsibilities of AC and preparing the proxy statement. The code discusses how the 
company’s quarterly financial statements and annual ly audited financial statements are 
discussed with both the management and the CPA firm. The code also allow the review 
of other issues with the CPA firm, any audit difficulties or problems and management’s 
response; besides, setting clear hiring policies for former employees or current 
employees of CPA firm; additionally, reporting regularly to BD. Finally, Each listed 
company must have an internal audit function. 
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3-2 Similarities and differences between 
AC Codes in US, UK and Egypt. 
Below is a comparative showing similarities and differences between the UK (AC Code), 
USA (AC Code and Toolkit) and the Egyptian AC Code: 
Subject UK USA Egypt 
1. Establishment & role  
Establishment  Very detailed Brief2 Brief 
Appointment  Very detailed Brief Brief 
Meetings of AC  Very detailed Very detailed Brief 
2. Resources      
AC Resources  Detailed Detailed N/A 
Adviser/Counsel Brief Very detailed Brief 
Remuneration  Very detailed N/A N/A 
3. Skills & Experience    
AC Financial Expert Brief Very detailed Brief 
     Experience & Training Very detailed Very detailed N/A 
4. AC relation with BD Very detailed Detailed N/A 
5. Financial Reporting Very detailed Very detailed Detailed 
6. Internal Control(fraud)    
Internal Control Very detailed Very detailed Brief 
Fraud N/A Very detailed N/A 
7. Whistle-Blowing Brief Very detailed N/A 
8. Internal Audit Function    
Internal Audit Process Detailed Detailed Detailed 
Evaluating    Detailed Very detailed Brief 
9. External Audit    
Appointment  Very detailed Detailed Brief 
Independence  Very detailed  Detailed  Detailed  
Non-Audit services Very detailed  Brief Detailed  
10. Annual Audit Cycle  Very detailed  Very detailed  Brief  
11. Communication with 
Shareholders 
Very detailed Brief N/A 
                                                                 
2
 Brief means that the subject was mentioned only without any justification, Very Detailed and Detailed referrers 
to the length of and comprehensi veness of each subject in the illustrated references. 
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3-3-1 Establishment & Role of AC. 
In relation to the establishment of AC, the UK AC Code described in details the 
responsibility of the BD in appointing the AC members who should be independent and 
non-executive members. In case when a company has a Nomination Committee, the 
recommendation to the BD will be through that committee. The AC chair has also to 
play a role in choosing the AC members. The UK AC Code indicated that the BD chair 
could not be an AC member (Copnell, 2005, pp. 51,131). On the other hand, the US 
toolkit included that the AC members will also be members in the BD (AICPA, 2008, p. 
8). As to Egypt the AC Code described the responsibility of BD to establish the AC 
without any other details as follows; “The General Assembly constitutes a committee of 
non-executive BD members called the AC” (Capital Market Authority, 2006, p. 8). In 
order to enhance the Egyptian AC Code the researcher proposes the following addition: 
 Independent non-executive members of the AC shall be appointed by BD on the 
recommendation of the Nomination Committee in consultation with AC Chairman. The   
BD should appoint the AC Chairman. The BD chairman should not be a member of the 
AC; each AC member shall be a BD member. 
 
In relation to the appointment of the AC, the UK AC Code limited the term of AC 
members to only 3 years, with a possibility of extension for another two terms (FRC, 
2003, p. 48). The US Code also restricted the number of the ACs by three committees 
that each member can serve in at the same time. Such restriction will help to enhance 
the member’s independence (NYSE, 2003, p. 10). The US toolkit did not include any 
details other than the three members’ condition. Moreover, each member was advised 
to show transparency in relation to the existence of any situation of conflict of interest 
with her/his membership of the AC (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 12). Deloitte’s handbook 
included another detail about the quorum of AC; consisting of three members (Deloitte, 
2008, p. 75). The Egyptian AC Code did not include such details for the appointment of 
AC by stating; “The AC comprises not less than three non-executive members. One 
member should be a financial and accounting expert. In case of an insufficient number 
of non-executives, one or more members may be appointed from outside the company.” 
(Egyptian Institute of Directors, 2005, p. 12). To enhance the Egyptian AC Code for 
better and more effective guidance, the researcher proposes the following addition: 
Every AC member appointment should be only for a period of 3 years and extendable 
by no more than another two periods. Three AC members constitute a quorum. If any AC 
member serves in more than 3 listed companies at the same time and none of these 
companies limit the number of AC on which its AC members serve, in every case the BD 
should decide that this situation will not impair the ability of such AC member in serving 
the company’s AC effectively, such decision should be disclosed in the organization’s AC 
section of the annual report. Each member of AC should be responsible to announce 
pro-actively any potential conflict of interest identified on the AC’s agenda or from 
changes in the member’s personal circumstances. The AC Chair should determine an 
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appropriate procedure with the member. If the AC Chair has a conflict of interest, the BD 
should ask another AC member to lead in determining the appropriate procedure.  
 
The last part of the establishment and role concerns the meetings, which are key for 
effective use of the AC work. The UK AC Code stated that only AC members should 
attend the meetings while others could attend when invited for all or part of the meeting. 
In addition, AC should meet CPA firm and internal auditors separately at least once a 
year for issues concerning the AC responsibility (FRC, 2003, p. 48), (FRC, 2005, p. 6). 
The US toolkit encouraged programming the meetings depending on the AC charter 
and audit plans for internal and external auditors. The AC minutes should be circulated 
before the next meeting. The toolkit also emphasized that AC members should be 
reachable when needed (AICPA, 2008, p. 9), (AICPA, 2007, p. 3). The ICSA Guide 
included many details, such as the AC ability to call any employee for questioning, that 
minutes should be circulated to internal and external auditors, that the meeting agenda 
should be sent to participants five days earlier, and that some other necessary 
documents should be attached to the minutes after reviewed by full BD (Copnell, 2005, 
pp. 16,57). Deloitte’s handbook stated that the CFO and CPA firm would be attending 
most of the meetings; sufficient time should be allowed between AC and BD meetings 
to allow carrying out necessary actions identified by ACs (Deloitte, 2008, pp. 59,118). 
The AC handbook included one important detail, that executive managers could attend 
the whole or only part of the meetings (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 11). Another research 
stated that the documentation of meetings should be in minutes, which is considered 
very important, that AC members must grasp everything without relying on the minutes 
and that meetings should be programmed ahead including topics and nature in the 
charter (Morrow & Pastor, 2007, pp. 46,51). Some researchers discussed that meetings 
should be more than 30 minutes and to push for more concentration (Carpenter, 
Fennema, Fretwell, & Hillison, 2004, p. 62). Another researcher included that the AC 
should meet the CPA firm at least quarterly and when necessary (Hnatt, 2001, p. 50). 
Two researchers argued that the AC should discuss the earnings and financial 
statements each term and at the year-end with management and the CPA firm 
(Sweeney & Vallario, 2002, p. 54). The Egyptian AC Code did not include most of the 
details above concerning the meetings of the AC and only discussed the following; “The 
committee should meet periodically, at least once every three months, with a specified 
agenda” (Egyptian Institute of Directors, 2005, p. 12). In order to develop CG practice in 
Egypt the following provisions are proposed for the Egyptian AC Code:  
 Only the AC’s chairman and members are allowed to attend the meeting of AC . The AC 
may call any employee to a meeting for questioning as and when necessary. It is 
expected, however, that the chief executives, the CPA firm  and the CFO3 would be 
invited to attend most AC (executive) meetings as they will be a significant source of 
information for many of the topics covered.  
                                                                 
3
 CFO: Chief Financial Officer. 
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There should be sufficient time between AC meetings and BD meetings to allow actions 
arising from the AC meeting to be carried out and reported to the BD as appropriate. The 
agenda should be set in advance for the AC meetings based upon the AC charter, key 
financial reporting dates and the planned work of the internal and external auditors. The 
agenda, the time and date of every meeting should be sent to the participants no later 
than five working days before every meeting. 
 The AC meeting discussions should be documented in AC meeting minutes. When any 
meeting is over; every member should have a common understanding of the key issues 
discussed without referring to the notes and minutes. Formal minutes should be 
prepared, circulated to internal and external auditors as appropriate, approved by the AC 
and then reviewed by the full BD. Important documents related to the meeting should be 
attached to the minutes, including the agenda. Minutes should be circulated no later than 
before the next meeting. 
The AC should meet the internal auditor and the CPA firm, each separately, at least 
once annually without any involvement from the BD’s side, to discuss matters from the 
field or the audit. The AC should also meet with the CPA firm at least quarterly; the 
auditor should be given to understand that s/he could meet the AC if any critical issue 
should arise between programmed meetings. There should be no more short (30 
minutes) meetings. All the details of the meetings should be programmed as far ahead 
as possible in the charter including number, topics, and nature of meetings.  
The AC should discuss, at the end of every term and every year, the earnings guidance, 
earnings releases for the term and for the annual financial statements. Discussing 
quarterly and annual financial reports with the management and CPA firm will give the 
AC a chance to review the policy of disclosure, the business operations and income. The 
AC should do this every quarter before submitting its report and the interim/yearend 
financial statements to the EGX.   
 
3-3-2 Resources.  
With regard to the AC Resources part, the UK AC Code contained two issues under this 
category. The first issue is the availability of money for the AC to manage its 
responsibilities. The second issue concerns the free access to all the resources in the 
company, such as all the data-bases and archives for information, including different 
kinds of reports, drafts, minutes and flow-charts with the possibility to use the company 
secretary (FRC, 2003, p. 49), (FRC, 2008, p. 7), (FRC, 2005, p. 7). At the same time, 
the US toolkit included the same issues with more concentration on internet resources 
and other published resources (of which the toolkit itself is an important part) (AICPA, 
2009, p. 28). One researcher emphasized the importance of providing extra money for 
emergency because AC work may need more meetings for certain areas or problem 
solving situations (Savich, 2006, p. 73). Another researcher concentrated on the 
management responsibility of providing the information without even being asked from 
the AC side, as this was seen as leading to full access of all the company’s data, as 
timing is an important factor in this matter (Bean Jr., 1999, pp. 48,49). The Egyptian AC 
Code did not include any statement about the AC Resources; therefore, the researcher 
proposes the following provisions to enhance the CG practice in the country:  
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The AC should be supplied with adequate resources to undertake its duties. Many 
companies give information to aid the AC in carrying out its responsibilities. Companies 
should recognize that their ACs may necessitate extra funding because of additional 
meetings or more consultants to answer questions about alternative financial 
treatments. Organizations should budget accordingly when they establish an AC . 
The AC should have the right to use services of the corporate secretariat on all AC 
matters including: helping the chairman in planning the AC’s work, drafting of materials 
about its activities for the annual report, maintenance of minutes, drawing up meeting 
agendas, gathering and sharing of information and provision of any needed practical 
support. Ready access to all books, records and employees of the corporation must be 
assured.  
The corporate secretary ensures that the AC gets information in a timely basis to allow 
proper and full consideration to the issues. It is management’s responsibility to keep the 
AC informed of routine and sensitive or controversial information, at the same time, this 
information should be available to AC in a timely manner.                                        
 
As to the Adviser/Counsel part, the US toolkit included the qualifications of the formal 
expert and noted that s/he should not have a conflict of interest with the company, and 
should have enough resources to do the job, the competence and experience to do the 
necessary service, and the personal characteristics crucial to the job. As the 
Adviser/Counsel’s engagement is representing the AC itself, so the management should 
be fully cooperative with him in relation to data requested and reports information 
(AICPA, 2008, p. 35). The UK AC Code only stated the possibility of engaging 
independent advisers. A researcher indicated that there should be sufficient funding for 
the hiring of experts even without the need for BD approval, and that the law 
encouraged the use of independent advisors (Bean Jr., 1999, p. 48). The Egyptian 
Code  was much briefer about the issue, stating that, “The company should make 
facilities available to help the audit committee perform its function including the hiring of 
external experts whenever required” (Egyptian Institute of Directors, 2005). In order to 
enhance the Egyptian AC Code the researcher proposes the following provisions: 
ACs must have the authority to hire independent counsel and other advisers as it 
believes necessary to carry out its duties. The AC should decide upon service 
provider(s) that: (1) maintains objectivity and integrity; (2) have a reputation for 
reliability, among other considerations; (3) have the resources and expertise necessary 
to do the work; and (4) are free of conflicts of interest with respect to the members of 
AC and the company. AC should make sure that management understands that the 
Adviser/Counsel is working on behalf of the AC and the AC expects management to be 
fully forthcoming and cooperative. 
Funding should be available to the AC in retaining an outside legal counsel without 
approval from BD and the retaining of an external accounting firm if a 2nd opinion is 
called for. AC should engage more in having CPAs advise on audit and accounting 
matters. 
 
For the remuneration part, the UK AC Code determined the payment for the AC 
members based on their responsibilities compared to BD members’, expertise also 
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plays an important part; there should be a special consideration for the work of AC chair 
because of extra effects and time allocated to the work of AC (FRC, 2008, p. 7). The US 
toolkit did not discuss this issue. The Egyptian AC Manual stated that the fee should be 
adequate and should not be extremely high, but it still should attract good directors 
(EIOD, 2007, p. 12). A researcher specified some conditions on AC members, such as 
dedicating time and working hard (Scarpati, 2003, p. 34); in order to have higher 
compensations than other BD members, payment could be in cash or by stock options 
(Sweeney & Vallario, 2002, p. 53). In the case of the Egyptian AC Code, this issue was 
not part of the Code, and in order to enhance it, the researcher will propose the 
following provision:    
The level of remuneration rewarded to the members of AC should take into account 
the extra responsibilities of membership and the level of fees paid to other members of 
BD. Importance should be given to the skills AC members are bring to endure the 
difficult duties they take on. Serving on the AC requires a significant time commitment, 
including organizing for meetings as well as attending them. Remuneration should be 
sufficient to recognize the time the AC takes and the responsibilities accepted in order 
to attract responsible and good directors; the salary should not be excessive such that a 
dispute may be perceived. Therefore the AC members could get more remuneration 
than other BD members. AC members might get their salaries in cash or corporation 
stock, options or other consideration ordinarily offered to directors. The responsibilities 
of the AC chairman and time challenges will generally be heavier than the other 
members of AC and this should be reflected in her/his remuneration. 
 
3-3-3 Skills & Experience. 
With regard to the AC Financial Expert, the UK AC Code was vague about this issue as 
it stated, “The BD should satisfy itself that at least one member of the AC has recent 
and relevant financial experience” (FRC, 2008, p. 6). Therefore, the Code did not 
specify that there should be an AC financial expert as such. On the other hand, the US 
toolkit clearly identified specific qualifications and experiences that this expert should 
hold, such as being aware of the size, complexity and industry of the company. The 
toolkit also affirmed that even if the expert had worked in accounting/auditing jobs as a 
manager, this does not qualify her/him to be an AC financial expert; the BD should 
consider the highest professional and personal qualifications when choosing a nominee. 
The toolkit also confirmed that her/his name should be disclosed in the annual report 
(AICPA, 2009, pp. 143,147,148,150). The Egyptian AC Code was very brief about the 
expert, “One member should be a financial and accounting expert” (Egyptian Institute of 
Directors, 2005, p. 12). Based on all the above discussions, the researcher finds it 
appropriate to propose the following provisions to enhance and develop the Egyptian 
AC Code: 
The AC Financial Expert should possess professional experience that will be relevant to 
the operations of the AC, such as: 
 thorough understanding of AC’s oversight function; 
 expertise in financial matters as well as having a through grasp of financial 
statements; 
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 the capacity to ask the right questions to decide whether the corporation’s financial 
statements are accurate and complete; 
 the size of the organization with which the individual has experience; 
 the scope of that corporation’s operations; and 
 the complexity of its accounting and financial statements. 
Previous experience in accounting jobs by itself does not validate the BD to hire a given 
applicant as an AC Financial Expert; the BD must guarantee that it names an AC 
Financial Expert who embodies the highest values of professional and personal 
integrity. Companies must include the Financial Expert disclosure in their AC section of 
the annual report.  
When the company reaches the maximum number of AC members; then it could hire 
Financial Experts as advisors to the AC, where they should be financially qualified and 
have experience of working in the concerned country.   
With regard to experience and training, the UK AC Code stated that training will be 
offered to all AC members periodically and continually including on the company’s 
regulations. Training could take several forms such as courses or seminars, with more 
focus on new members (FRC, 2005, p. 8). On the other hand, the US toolkit also 
included the financial literacy of the AC members and that they should have continuing 
education. The US Code also emphasized the financial literacy of all members  (NYSE, 
2003, p. 10). At the same time, the ICSA Guide emphasized the experience in financial 
reporting in accounting records (Copnell, 2005, p. 9). McCarthy expressed that 
Sarbanes-Oxley encouraged finding gaps in member’s education and offering the 
necessary training to address them (McCarthy E. , 2004, p. 44). Zacharias also 
constrained the hiring of members that do not have financial literacy as they must 
become literate in a reasonable time (Zacharias, 2000, p. 55). The AC handbook stated 
that the BD and AC should agree on the qualifications required for an AC member and 
those qualifications had to be re-examined annually (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 13). The 
Egyptian AC Code stated; “Gather all the international developments in accounting and 
auditing and notify the BD, including what AC believes is important for the company”  
(Capital Market Authority, 2006, p. 9). In order to formulate a more detailed CG Code to 
develop the AC practice in Egypt, the researcher proposes the following provision: 
Training should be offered to all members of the AC on a timely and ongoing basis and 
should include an understanding of related company bylaws and recent developments 
in financial reporting. The training may take many forms including seminars and internal 
company talks, formal conferences and courses, and briefings by external advisers. 
There should be more focus on training new AC members. Every member of the AC 
must be financially literate; specifically, AC members must have expertise, or access to 
expertise, that goes beyond mere familiarity with financial statement. Potential gaps in 
AC members’ business and technical knowledge should be identified and offers training 
made as needed. Corporations, with a stated market capitalization, must have AC 
members financially literate or who will become financially literate within a reasonable 
time after their appointment. The AC should identify, and agree with the BD on the skills 
required; the required set of skills should be periodically reviewed. 
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3-3-4 AC relation with BD.  
The UK AC Code described this issue comprehensively with many details. The BD 
should examine the AC annually. The disagreement between the AC and the BD should 
be given sufficient time to be resolved but otherwise should be disclosed in the annual 
report (FRC, 2008, p. 8), (FRC, 2003, p. 51). The US toolkit was also detailed about this 
issue and called for the BD to approve the charter and for the AC chair to be 
responsible for evaluating the members’ performance annually and consider 
replacement if necessary. The toolkit also addressed the AC annual review of executive 
managers’ comments about the AC performance. The toolkit explained that the charter 
should be modified when new changes take place and called for the AC to recommend 
needed changes to the BD, such as changes in the law or/and practice (AICPA, 2007, 
pp. 3,8). The US Code determined that the AC charter should contain some basic 
elements for effective AC functions such as AC responsibilities, periodical evaluation 
and purpose (NYSE, 2003, pp. 10-11). A writter demonistrated that the direct reporting 
relationship from the AC to the BD will help the AC to fulfil its stewardship duty toward 
the stakeholders (Braiotta, 2004, pp. 70,94). The ICSA Guide included the AC chair 
reporting responsibility to BD after each meeting, and also required that the AC charter 
should be available on the orgnization’s website (Copnell, 2005, pp. 56,147). The AC 
handbook refered to the responsibility of the BD to assign the AC’s duties, and stated 
that this will require an annual review of AC’s effectiveness (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 10). 
The Egyptian AC manual included the scope of AC work in the charter briefly (EIOD, 
2007, p. 11). A researcher explained that every AC member should have a scheme to 
follow, such as the charter (Bean Jr., 1999, p. 48), which should also be developed with 
the help of CPAs by suggesting input concerning the accounting and financial issues in 
their company (Kroll, 2005, p. 68). The Egyptian AC Code did not include any 
arguments for this issue so the researcher proposes the following provisions to develop 
the Egyptian Code: 
The fiduciary role of AC is set forth by the AC charter matrix after being approved by the 
BD. The AC should report directly to the BD, the AC chairman should report formally to 
the BD on its proceedings after each meeting on all issues within its responsibilities and 
duties.  The AC is an integral part of the corporate framework in helping to fulfill the 
BD’s stewardship responsibility to its outside stakeholders. Setting the right tone at the 
top4 will also require considering the size of the company, the industry and competitive 
environment.  
The AC should get formal Terms of Reference set by the BD. These should be reviewed 
annually by the BD and in turn should require the AC to annually review its own 
effectiveness and recommend any needed changes to the BD. This will include 
reviewing its strengths and weaknesses and setting a foundation for future 
enhancement. The CFO, CEO, CAE and CPA firm must make comments on the 
performance of the AC. The BD should review AC’s effectiveness annually. 
 
When there is a disagreement between the AC and BD, enough time should be made 
available for debate of the issue with a view to resolve the discrepancy. When any such 
                                                                 
4
 Control environment or  tone at the top of the organization, meaning the integrity, ethical values, and competence of 
the entity’s people, management’s philosophy and operating style, the way management assigns authority and 
responsibility, organizes and develops its people, and the attention and direction provided by the board of directors. It 
is the foundation for all other components of internal control, providing dis cipline and structure. (AICPA, 2009, p. 47) 
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disagreements cannot be resolved, AC should have the right to report the issue to the 
shareholders as part of the report on its activities in their section of the annual report. 
The AC must have a written charter that includes: 
 the purpose;  
 the requirement to prepare a statement in the annual report; 
 provision for annual performance evaluation of the AC; and  
 the duties and responsibilities of AC.  
Every AC member needs a reference manual to perform her/his job well. CPAs should 
contribute in developing their company’s AC charter by presenting input on internal 
oversight and controls of the financial reporting and accounting processes. The Charter 
depicts the scope of AC tasks and how it fulfills these tasks. The charter must be posted 
on the corporation website. The AC charter should be reviewed annually (unless 
changes are needed during the current year) recommending any proposed changes to 
the BD taking into  consideration new best practices, last year’s experience, 
appropriateness and new laws or regulations.        
 
3-3-5 Financial Reporting. 
 In relation to this subject, the UK AC Code explained this issue very deeply, and 
included that it is management’s not AC’s responsibility to prepare the financial 
statements. The UK AC Code encouraged the AC to address the BD when there are 
any mistakes or misstatements in the financial reporting, which is considered one of the 
major responsibilities of the AC (FRC, 2005, p. 9). A writter emphasized on what the UK 
Code explained and added that the AC and BD should affirm the integrity or quality of 
the fianancial statements and that management is to abide by  the regulations (Braiotta, 
2004, p. 28). ICSA Guide argued for the preapproval of information attached to the 
financial statement, by AC records before the BD approval, such as CG statements and 
cash-flow statements (Copnell, 2005, p. 20). The Egyptian AC Code included detail that 
the AC should ”Review the company's accounting policies and give opinions and 
recommendations” (Egyptian Institute of Directors, 2005, p. 12), ”Examine the drafted 
financial statements before submission to the BD for approval and sent to the CPA firm 
for review” (Capital Market Authority, 2006, p. 8). Reflecting this discussion, the 
proposed provisions of the Egyptian AC Code will be the following: 
The AC should examine with the full BD any issues that concern the quality or integrity 
of the corporation’s financial statements and the organization’s compliance with legal or 
regulatory constraints. If AC is not satisfied with any aspect of the proposed financial 
reporting, by the management, it shall report it to the BD. 
The AC should review related information presented with the financial statements, 
including corporate governance statements, and the financial and operating review 
relating to risk management and to the audit. Similarly, where BD approval is required 
for other statements containing financial information, whenever practicable, the AC 
should review such statements first. 
 
3-3-6 Internal Control  
With regard to internal Control, the UK AC Code included that the AC should receive 
reports from management on effectiveness of internal control after the latter have been 
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examined by auditors. In addition, the AC should approve the internal control 
statements attached to the annual report concerning risk management (FRC, 2008, p. 
10), (FRC, 2003, p. 52). The US toolkit provided more details about this subject 
indicating that it is the management’s responsibility to maintain the system, while the AC 
has to make sure that it is operating accurately. While doing so, the AC is representing 
the BD and stakeholders; the AC main responsibility in this issue is to prevent 
management override of internal controls. The AC may depend on executive managers 
and the CPA firm in this issue. The AC needs to create a portfolio for risks faced by the 
company and identify strategies to minimize their affects on the company. The AC 
should periodically make sure that the company’s code of conduct is adequate (AICPA, 
2008, pp. 44,45), (AICPA, 2009, p. 11), (AICPA, 2007, pp. 13,18). Some researchers 
stated that the annual report should contain reports about internal control and its 
effectiveness (Coustan, Leinicke, Rexroad, & Ostrosky, 2004, p. 43). Another 
researcher stated that the AC should examine legal issues and regulations concerning 
risk and financial reporting (Klein, 2006, p. 6). As to the Egyptian AC Code, it stated that 
the AC should “Examine the internal control structure and prepare a report including 
opinion and recommendations; and discuss all the amendments in control structure to 
ensure its ongoing effectiveness” (Capital Market Authority, 2006, p. 8). In fact, the 
Egyptian AC Code did not include many details so the researcher will propose the 
following provisions to enhance the Egyptian practice:      
The company’s management is fully responsible for internal control. The AC needs to 
be confident that the controls are in place and operating successfully. The AC should 
receive reports from management on the efficiency of the systems they have buil t and 
the conclusions of any testing done by external and internal auditors. The AC 
represents the BD and other stakeholders in guaranteeing that the company has an 
adequate system of internal controls. The AC should review and approve the 
statements in the annual report in relation to internal control and the management of 
risk except to the extent that this is expressly dealt with by the BD or risk committee. 
Each issuer’s annual report should include an internal control report that shall report on 
the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. 
The AC should examine government regulations and legal issues as they relate to the 
company’s financial statements and assess the risk profile of the internal controls and 
company’s activities themselves. The AC shall support preparation of the Statement on 
Internal Control in the annual report. 
One of the particular issues of concern to the AC is the responsibility to deter or prevent 
a management override of internal controls. Questions about management override and 
about uncovering an override should be addressed to the CPA firm, CEO, CAE and 
CFO. The AC should create a portfolio documenting the company’s material risks with 
updates. It should review annually the organization’s code of conduct to guarantee that 
it is reliable and up-to-date.  
 
In relation to fraud, the UK AC Code and the Egyptian AC Code did not include any 
terms concerning this subject. Only the US toolkit addressed this issue in detail: it stated 
that; in the instance of the fraud, the issue should be reported by the CPA firm to the AC 
giving the BD one business day to contact the government agency about the issue. At 
the same time, the CPA firm must report this to the government agency by the end of 
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the next day (AICPA, 2008, p. 93). Due to the importance of this issue, the researcher 
proposes the following provisions to be added to the Egyptian Code:    
Fraud involving senior management, and any fraud, whether caused by senior 
management or other employees that causes a material misstatement must be reported 
to the AC by the CPA firm. The BD has one business day to notify the EFSA5 within that 
one business day, the CPA firm is required to send to the EFSA, by the end of the next 
business day, a copy of the report or documentation of any oral report. 
 
3-3-7 Whistle-Blowing. 
 This issue was discussed in the UK AC Code in less detail than the US toolkit, stating 
only that complaints from staff should be handled of and if necessary investigation 
should follow serious cases, so it was not part of the proposed terms. On the other 
hand, the US toolkit explained in details the process of whistle blowing. It stated that the 
listed companies are required to provide a system to handle complaints by stakeholders 
regarding violations. If the person complaining was not satisfied with the treatment of 
her/his complaint, s/he should forward it to an AC member. The names and addresses 
of AC members for this reason should be available on the company’s website or/and 
contacts for the hotline if the company has one, in any case. The confidentiality of the 
complainer should be protected. It is the authority of the AC to determine the 
appropriate corrective action according to its terms of reference, or to recommend a 
course of actions to the full BD. The AC could engage an independent adviser/counsel 
to help in the investigation (AICPA, 2008, pp. 59-61). Savich emphasized the availability 
of written procedures that any stakeholder could follow to file a complaint and receive 
appropriate treatment (Savich, 2006, p. 73). As to the Egyptian AC Code, it did not 
contain any provision to deal with this situation, so the researcher proposes the 
following process to manage the issue of complaining to help the ACs to become able 
to manage such matters professionally:   
AC of listed companies are required by the whistle-blower provision to review any 
complaints received by the company, whether generated internally or externally, 
regarding internal accounting controls or auditing matters. Company 
employees/directors should forward to a member of the AC any complaint received by 
them that has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the person who raised the 
complaint. 
If an employee was unsuccessful in resolving a concern through normal channels, the 
employee should contact a member of the AC (the names and phone numbers of AC 
members should be listed on the Company’s internet), or call the hotline if such exists. 
The confidentiality of the employee should be guaranteed. Any employee, supplier or 
customer who detects misrepresentation and/or fraud within a company should be able 
to follow the procedures the AC has established for the receipt, treatment and retention 
of complaints. 
An investigation by the AC determines whether a corrective action is appropriate. To the 
extent of the AC’s need, it may engage outside advisors to assist in the investigation. 
The AC will, to the extent it has identified a need for corrective action, implement such 
action or recommend a course of actions to the full BD. 
                                                                 
5
 Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority. 
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3-3-8 Internal Audit Function (IAF)  
With regard to the Internal Audit Process, the UK AC Code was very detailed about this 
subject but it included evaluating the need for such a function, which is not applicable in 
Egypt due to the requirement of all listed companies to have an IAF. The supervisory 
authority’s regulations state that, “The company should maintain a tight internal control 
system established by the BD members and directors” (Capital Market Authority, 2006, 
p. 13). The same function was also required in the Sarbanes-Oxley act. The 
responsibility of AC to hire the CAE was mentioned in the Egyptian Code but in the part 
dealing with the IAF as follows: “The audit department’s head is appointed, reappointed, 
financial terms arranged and dismissed by the CEO; subject [to] the approval of the AC” 
(Egyptian Institute of Directors, 2005, p. 10). The UK Code noted that executive 
managers will have a better assurance about the internal control and risk if the IAF is 
adequately resourced in a way that it fulfills its mandates and equipped to perform in 
line with formal internal audit standards (FRC, 2008, p. 10), (FRC, 2003, pp. 52-53). 
The US toolkit noted that the AC should have a strong relationship with the IAF as its 
eyes and ears to be able to maintain oversight of its activities; likewise, the CAE should 
also have a direct and positive contact with the AC. In the time of economic crises and 
cost cutting, the IAF should not be part of this, in fact it should be asked to do extra 
work especially in these times. AC should create an agenda or approve the CAE’s 
agenda for next year (AICPA, 2005, pp. 105,106), (AICPA, 2007, p. 20). Two 
researchers emphasized the AC’s responsibility to review the IAF budget and plan to 
match them against the CPA firm’s objectives (Read & Raghunandan, 2001, p. 60). 
Another study asserted that IAF team performance should be parallel to the 
performance of the rest of employees in the company to develop their experience  
(Rittenberg & Anderson, 2006, p. 54). The Egyptian AC Code included only some 
details in this part stating that the AC should, “Review the reports submitted by the 
internal auditor and any corrective measures taken” (Egyptian Institute of Directors, 
2005, p. 12). Therefore, the researcher proposes the following provisions that the 
Egyptian Code  missed to enhance implementation of CG practice:  
The internal audit function should have a direct reporting relationship with the AC and 
the AC should provide oversight of its activity. The AC and the internal audit team 
should maintain a strong positive relationship. The CAE should have a solid line 
reporting relationship to the AC. The AC should create an agenda for the coming year 
or approve and review the CAE’s agenda. 
The BD and senior management may desire objective assurance and advice on control 
and risk. An adequately resourced internal audit function may provide such assurance 
and advice.  
The AC should review the internal audit function, including the internal audit budget and 
proposed audit plans for the coming year and how such plans reflect the CPA firm’s 
objectives. The AC should guarantee that the function has resources and access to 
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information to fulfill its mandate, and is equipped to perform in line with appropriate 
professional standards for internal auditors. In times of cutting costs, the internal audit 
function should not be the victim of a company downsizing; in fact, it should be doing 
extra monitoring at precisely this time. 
In relation to the evaluating of the IAF, the UK AC Code stated that: the AC should 
make sure that the IAF is well resourced. The AC should guarantee that IAF team has 
direct access to the BD’s and AC’s chairs and is accountable to the AC (FRC, 2008, p. 
11). The US toolkit was more detailed about the evaluation and included establishing an 
improvement and quality assurance program, which provides continued evaluation for 
the IAF team, which should be done minimally every 5 years. The toolkit also added that 
the AC and executive managers should meet once every year to evaluate the 
performance of the CAE (AICPA, 2007, p. 10). A researcher noted the need for the 
quality assurance program for the IAF to be done by an independent reviewing team 
from outside the organization (Protiviti, 2009, p. 31). Another researcher asserted that 
the HR also has some role in the evaluation of the IAF in parallel with the overall 
organizational strategy  (Rittenberg & Anderson, 2006, p. 54). The Egyptian AC Code 
did mention the evaluation of the IAF briefly, stating: the AC should “Review and 
discuss the internal audit department plan and its efficiency” (Egyptian Institute of 
Directors, 2005, p. 12). Due to that the researcher proposes the following provisions:  
The AC should ensure that the internal auditor team has direct access to the BD’s 
chairman and to the AC and is accountable to the AC. 
Companies should establish an Improvement and Quality Assurance Program that 
includes both periodic and ongoing internal QAs and undergoes an external QA a 
minimum of once every 5 years, by a qualified independent reviewer or review team 
from out-side the organization. Internal audit’s behavior should be parallel with the 
organization’s overall HR strategies to enhance the employees’ experiences. AC should 
meet annually with executive managers and the CPA firm to discuss the performance of 
CAE. 
 
3-3-9 External Audit  
With regard to the appointment of the CPA firm, the UK AC Code was extremely 
detailed about this issue. Overseeing the relation between management and the CPA 
firm is the AC’s responsibility. CPA firm resignation should be scrutinized by the AC. 
The AC should describe in the annual report the hiring, firing, and reappointment of the 
CPA firm. The description should also include audit fee rates in the market and any kind 
of limitations to the choice of audit firm. The AC should update the audit contract at the 
start of every audit according to the scope; if the AC is not satisfied then further 
amendment must be made to the contract (FRC, 2003, p. 53),(FRC, 2005, pp. 
12,13),(FRC, 2008, pp. 12,13). The US toolkit was less detailed about this issue; 
assigning the AC to establish the fees for the CPA firm, comparing audit fees with non-
audit services fees. The ICSA Guide mentioned that the AC must guarantee that the 
CPA firm is responsible to the AC, BD and shareholders. If the BD did not accept the 
AC’s recommendation, the AC should describe this in the annual report with the reason 
for different viewpoints between the BD and AC (Copnell, 2005, pp. 39,40). A 
researcher discussed the need for the client in the CPA engagement letter to be the AC 
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and not the management anymore (Bean Jr., 1999, p. 52). Another researcher noted 
that the CPA firm staff should have a more direct working relationship with the AC 
(McCarthy E. , 2004, p. 43). Braiotta’s book added that that AC should discuss the 
contract with the executive CPA firm partner (Braiotta, 2004, p. 224). The Egyptian AC 
Code stated some terms in this issue: “The BD should nominate an external auditor with 
a good reputation and experience on the recommendation of the AC. The external 
auditor should be able to handle the tasks according to the company size, nature and 
customers” and the external auditor “is appointed and his annual remuneration is 
determined by the GA” (Egyptian Institute of Directors, 2005, p. 11). In order to develop 
the Egyptian AC Code the researcher suggests the following provisions:  
The AC is responsible for overseeing the organization’s relations with the CPA firm. The 
CPA firm's engagement letter should state that the client is the AC, making it clear that 
the CPA firm is not obliged to management. As a result , the CPA firm’s partners and 
staff must work more closely with the AC. The AC should ensure that the CPA firm is 
accountable to the AC and through them to the BD and eventually the company’s 
shareholders.  
If the CPA firm resigned, the AC should investigate the matters giving rise to such 
resignation and consider whether any action is necessary. The AC should consider the 
need to include the risk of the departure of their CPA firm from the market in their risk 
evaluation and planning.  
The AC section of the annual report should describe to shareholders how the 
recommendation has been made to the BD on the appointment, reappointment or 
removal of the CPA firm. This should include supporting information on tendering rate, 
the tenure of the current CPA firm, and any contractual obligations that acted to limit the 
AC's choice of CPA firm. If the BD does not accept the AC’s recommendation, this 
should be disclosed by the AC in the annual report with the reasons for the different 
stance by the BD. 
The AC should review and discuss the engagement letter with the executive partner, 
concerning the updated new letter issued at the start of each audit and the scope of the 
external audit; if the AC is not satisfied with its adequacy then the AC should arrange for 
additional work to be done. 
 
In relation to Independence, the UK AC Code provided for the AC to examine and 
compare the fees paid by CPA firm to its staff with its income and related requirements. 
The AC and BD should agree on a policy for employment of former CPA firm’s 
employees who previously audited the company (FRC, 2005, p. 14), (FRC, 2008, pp. 
13-14). The US toolkit noted that the AC should answer many questions about its 
relation with the CPA firm with comments from executive managers (AICPA, 2008, p. 
111). The US AC Code included more details about the issue, including that the AC 
periodically should have a report from the CPA firm about internal quality control or peer 
review; also that the AC should review every 5 years governmental or professional 
inquires concerning the CPA firm. The AC should be aware of any irregularities and how 
the CPA firm dealt with them. All these steps permit the AC to evaluate the 
independence of the external auditor. The AC should present its conclusions about the 
independence of the CPA firm to the full BD (NYSE, 2003, p. 11). SEC encouraged 
direct discussion between the CPA firm and the AC about independence rather than 
doing it only on paper (Journal of Accountancy, 1999, p. 102). A researcher stated that 
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the AC should make sure that the lead and other partners of the CPA firm took their 
mandatory rotation after 5 years of engagement and were subject to five years time-out 
(Purcell III & Lifson, 2003, p. 35), the same rule applying for non-audit services 
(Pashkoff & Miller, 2002, p. 36). The Egyptian AC Manual included the need to evaluate 
the CPA firm’s efficiency, competence and quality of the audit to make sure that the 
audit fee is adequate to the size, nature and industry of the company to guarantee that 
the audit is not compromised (EIOD, 2007, p. 7). The Egyptian AC Code did include 
some provisions concerning the independence as follows: AC should “Assess the 
qualifications, performance and independence of the external auditor and give suggest 
recommendations in relation to the auditor’s appointment and remuneration. The 
external auditor is independent from the company and the BD. He should not be a 
shareholder or an expert BD member. The external auditor must be independent and 
hold neutral opinions. The auditor’s work is immunized against interference from the 
BD. Decisions to retain an auditor and/or to fix the auditor’s remuneration are not for the 
BD to take” (Egyptian Institute of Directors, 2005, pp. 11,12). Due to the lack of 
comprehensiveness of the Egyptian AC Code for the independence issue, the 
researcher proposes the following provisions:  
The AC evaluation should take into consideration the CPA firm’s competence, the 
efficiency and quality of the audit, and whether the audit fee is proper in relation to the 
size, risk, complexity and control profile of the organization to ensure that the 
organization’s audit is not compromised. AC should monitor the level of fees that the 
CPA firm pays in proportion to the overall fee income of the firm for officers and 
partners, and other related regulatory requirements.  
The discussion about independence between the CPA firm and the AC should be 
required; rather than encouraged by the CPA firm's written communication; therefore, 
the AC should answer a several questions about its relationship with the CPA firm, and 
should ask executives in the company for their comments as well. 
Annually, the AC should review and obtain a report by the CPA firm describing: the 
firm’s internal quality-control procedures; any relating material issues raised, or peer 
review, of the firm, or investigation or inquiry by governmental or professional 
authorities, within a period of five years, respecting one or more independent audits 
carried out by the firm, and any steps taken to deal with any such issues; and (to assess 
the CPA firm’s independence) all relationships between the CPA firm and the company. 
The AC makes sure that the mandatory rotation takes place by the CPA firm to the lead 
and other partners after five years on the engagement and then subjects them to a five-
year “time-out”. The same thing also applies for non-audit service CPA firm’s rotation. 
The AC should present its conclusions with respect to the CPA firm to the full BD. 
The AC should agree with the BD's policy for the employment of former employees of 
the CPA firm regarding employees who were part of the audit team and moved directly 
to the organization. Monitor the number of former employees of the CPA firm currently 
employed in senior positions in the company and whether this causes an impairment, of 
the CPA firm's objectivity and independence, in respect of the audit. 
 
With regard to the non-audit service, the UK AC Code included a requirement that the 
AC come up with a policy for non-audit services including; each contract should be 
decided on a case-by-case basis, the AC should approve all services, the CPA firm 
should be excluded from any services where mutual interest could develop between the 
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CPA firm and the company, and the external auditor cannot perform non-audit services, 
advocate, make management decisions or develop close personal relationships with 
staff of the company that it is auditing (FRC, 2003, pp. 55-56), (FRC, 2008, p. 15). The 
US toolkit was brief about this issue, mentioning that the AC should pre-approve any 
non-audit services, while Savich presented a comprehensive description. S/he 
advocated that any non-audit service exceeding 5% of audit fees should be approved 
by the AC, and that there are certain services that the AC should approve individually 
such as tax valuations, employee stock plans, etc. CPA firms should be prohibited from 
providing certain non-audit services to audit clients: bookkeeping, designing financial 
systems, HR, legal services, etc. (Savich, 2006, p. 73), (Pashkoff & Miller, 2002, p. 34). 
Sarbanes-Oxley restricted non-audit services exceeding 5% of total audit fees (US 
Congress, 2002, p. 28). Deloitte’s handbook stated that any non-audit services should 
not damage the objectivity or independence of CPA firm (Deloitte, 2008, p. 121). 
Similarly, another researcher affirmed that any services should be disclosed in the 
annual report (Braiotta, 2004, p. 22). The Egyptian AC Code includes some provisions 
concerning the issue but not as comprehensive nor as clearly understandable, as 
follows; the AC should “Approve the engagement of the external auditor to provide non-
audit services, and appropriate remuneration. The external auditor may not be 
contracted for additional company work without the prior approval of the audit 
committee. Extra duties should not interfere with the original assignment. The 
remuneration for extra work should match the tasks performed and not be exaggerated 
to a level that threatens the auditor’s independence. In all cases, these costs are 
approved at the GA meeting that follows” (Egyptian Institute of Directors, 2005, pp. 
11,12). The researcher proposes more details about this part in the following provisions:  
The AC should ensure that the provision of non-audit services does not impair the CPA 
firm’s independence or objectivity, and any such services should be disclosed in the AC 
section of the annual report. Non-audit services provided should not be more than 5% of 
the total amount paid to the CPA firm, but if the total of non-audit services exceeds 5% 
of total revenues paid by the company to the CPA firm, such services require explicit AC 
approval including the following: 
 Transfer pricing studies; 
 Cost segregation studies; 
 Tax-only valuations; 
 Comments on candidates for senior executive positions; 
 Tax: 
 Compliance; 
 Planning; 
 Advisory; and 
 But not representation in court case. 
 Lending tax staff for special projects; 
 Compensation packages; 
 Employee stock ownership plans; and 
 Requests for rulings.  
Some other services require BD approval no regardless of cost. 
The AC should set and apply a formal policy for types of non-audit work: 
 for which a case-by-case decision is necessary; 
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 for which the CPA firm can be engaged without referral to the AC and policy subject 
to a fee limits; 
 from which the CPA firm is excluded, with regards to the ethical guidance, to prevent 
the possibility that: 
 a mutuality of interest is created; 
 the CPA firm audits its own firm's work; 
 the CPA firm is put in the role of advocate for the company; 
 the CPA firm makes management decisions for the company; or 
 the CPA firm develops close personal relationships with the company's personnel. 
All registered CPA firms should be prohibited from providing audit clients of stock 
market listed companies, contemporaneously with the audit, certain non-audit services: 
 Bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial 
statements of the audit client; 
 The designing and implementation of the financial information systems; 
 Valuation or appraisal services; 
 Contribution-in-kind reports or fairness opinions; 
 Actuarial services; 
 The outsourcing of internal audit services; 
 Management functions; 
 Human Resources functions; 
 Investment banking services or broker/dealer, investment adviser; 
 Legal services; and 
 Expert services unrelated to the audit. 
 
3-3-10 Annual Audit Cycle (AAC). 
 In relation to this subject, the UK AC Code included detailed terms. The AC should 
make sure that CPA firm’s plan including materiality and resources are consistent with 
the scope of the audit and with regard to the qualifications of the audit team. The AC 
and CPA firm should review the findings of the latest audit including major issues 
(resolved and unresolved), levels of errors with explanations from management 
especially for unadjusted errors, and review bookkeeping and adjustments. The AC 
should review the CPA firm’s representation letters before management clearance, 
giving more focus to nonstandard issues. At the end, the AC assesses the AAC process 
by: reviewing whether the CPA firm meet its audit plan and any changes to address risk, 
review the CPA firm’s management letter to evaluate if it was based on the company’s 
business and whether recommendations were considered or not, and take feedback 
about the audit from executive managers (FRC, 2005, pp. 15,16), (FRC, 2003, pp. 56-
57), (FRC, 2008, p. 16). The US toolkit also included details such as: the need for 
coordination between the CPA firm audit plan and IAF team audit plan to ensure 
fulfillment, reduce redundancy, and for effective use of resources; the need for the AC 
to review CPA firm recommendations and the company’s response to those (AICPA, 
2007, p. 13), (AICPA, 2008, p. 4). The US Code stated that the AC should discuss 
disagreement between the CPA firm and management  (NYSE, 2003, p. 12), and the 
ICSA Guide concluded that the AC should provide solutions to any financial reporting 
disagreement between them (Copnell, 2005, p. 146). Arthur Levitt stated that the AC 
should get CPA firm opinion of the quality not just the acceptability of accounting 
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principles used in the company (Journal of Accountancy, 2000, pp. 16,17). Another 
reserchers added that the AC must meet with management and the CPA firm to review 
quarterly and annual financial statement for disclosure. The management must confirm 
in its letter that uncorrected misstatements are immaterial (Sweeney & Vallario, 2002, p. 
54). The Egyptian AC Code included the following: the AC should “Review the external 
auditor’s plan and make suggestions; review the external auditor's comments on the 
financial statements” (Egyptian Institute of Directors, 2005, p. 12). Due to the briefness 
of the Egyptian AC terms concerning this part; the researcher proposes the following 
provisions:  
The AC should consider whether the CPA firm’s overall work plan, including materiality 
and resources are consistent with the scope of the audit engagement, regarding also 
seniority, experience and expertise of the audit team. Review with the CPA firm, CFO 
and CAE, the audit plan and scope of the IAF team and the CPA firm. Coordinate for 
audit efforts to assure the reduction of redundant efforts, completeness of coverage, 
and the effective use of audit resources. 
There should be guidance for communication between the CPA firms and the ACs 
necessitating that the CPA firm get from the ACs their opinion of the quality, not just the 
acceptability, of the accounting principles used in the organization’s financial reports. 
The AC must meet with management and the CPA firm to review audited quarterly and 
annual financial statements, including the organization’s disclosures, under 
management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and operations. 
The AC should review, with the CPA firm, the findings of their work including: 
 discuss major issues that arose during the audit, those resolved and  any issues left 
unresolved; 
 review the levels of errors, obtaining explanations from management and, where 
necessary the CPA firm, as to why some errors might remain unadjusted, and 
 review audit judgments and book keeping. 
The AC should review the CPA firm representation letters before signature by 
management and give particular consideration to representation that relates to 
nonstandard issues to confirm completeness and appropriateness.  
AC should review the management letters including the recommendations of the CPA 
firm and management’s responses to those recommendations. The management 
should confirm, in the engagement letter, that any uncorrected misstatements are 
immaterial to the financial statement. 
At the end of the annual audit cycle, the AC should assess the effectiveness of the audit 
process including: 
 review whether the CPA firm has met its audit plan and recognized the reasons for 
any changes, including changes in audit risks and the work undertaken by the CPA 
firm to address those risks; 
 monitor and review the content of the CPA firm’s management letter to assess 
whether it is based on a good understanding of the organization’s business and 
establish whether recommendations have been taken in consideration and why; and  
 obtain feedback about the performance of the audit from key executives involved. 
The AC should regularly discuss with the CPA firm any difficulties or problems faced 
during the audit cycle and any major disagreements with management. The AC should 
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ensure solution of disagreements between the CPA firm and management regarding 
financial reporting. 
 
 
3-3-11 Communication with Shareholders 
 with regard to the last issue in this chapter, the UK AC Code provides that the AC’s 
terms of reference as delegated by the BD should be disclosed in the annual report 
including a summary of its role, the number of members, and its performance report 
(FRC, 2008, p. 17), (FRC, 2003, p. 57). The US toolkit mentioned that the annual report 
should include names and qualifications of the members and the financial expert if such 
existed.  (AICPA, 2008, p. 144). Zacharias argued that the AC should attach the charter 
to the annual report every three years (Zacharias, 2000, p. 55), Arthur Levitt added that 
the SEC (in Egypt the EFSA) should have jurisdiction over disclosure to the public 
especially the AC’s responsibilities, and the annual report should include discussions on 
the financial statement between management and CPA firm (Journal of Accountancy, 
2000, p. 15). Another writter added that the AC should disclose in the proxey statement 
if it satisfied the responsiblities stated in the AC’s charter (Braiotta, 2004, p. 16). 
Deloitte’s handbook provides that the AC chair will attend the AGM to answer any 
question concerning the AC’s work  (Deloitte, 2008, p. 79). In addition to these 
practices, the researcher recommends that the annual report should include unresolved 
disagreements between the AC and BD, appointing of the CPA firm, non-audit services 
and certain matters with external auditor (developed by researcher). The Egyptian AC 
Code did not include any terms concerning the part of communication with shareholders 
rather than including that AC should report its work results every three months. Due to 
this; the researcher suggests the following provisions to be added to the Egyptian AC 
Code to enhance the CG practice and develop AC effectiveness and performance of 
financial and internal control: 
The AC should disclose in its section of the annual report for its annual meeting whether 
the AC satisfied its responsibilities during the prior year in fulfilling the charter. The 
corporation should attach the charter to the AC section of the annual report triennially. 
The EFSA should have jurisdiction over reporting of information to the public especially 
how the AC handled its responsibilities.     
The terms of reference of the AC including its role and authority as delegated to it by the 
BD should be made available. The AC section of the annual report should include:  
 the number of AC meetings; 
 a summary of the role of the AC; 
 Names and qualifications of AC members, also disclosing whether there are one or 
more Financial Experts and giving the necessary explanation in the event that there 
are none; 
 The AC’s report must include discussion and reviewing of the audited financial 
statements with management and CPA firm; and     
 a report on the way the AC has executed its responsibilities. 
The Chairman of AC will be available at the Annual General Meeting to answer any 
question about the work of the AC. 
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The AC section of the annual report should include other matters concerning any 
disagreement between the AC and BD, the issue of appointing the CPA firm, provision 
of non-audit services and other pertinent matters regarding relations the CPA firm. 
 
Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
In this chapter, the researcher proposed the provisions that are necessary 
for the Egyptian AC listed companies. The introduction emphasized the 
urgent need for such provisions together with their expected benefits. The 
comparison of similarities and differences among different AC 
characteristics of U.S., U.K. AC Codes leading to a GAP in Egypt AC 
Code which requires addition to such a code. The remainder of the 
chapter was dedicated to a detailed review of the differing provisions in 
each area and the proposal of new or revised points:  
Establishment & Role; 
Resources; 
Skills & Experience; 
AC relation with BD; 
Financial Reporting; 
Internal Control; 
Whistle-Blowing; 
 IAF; 
External Audit; 
AAC; and 
Communication with Shareholders. 
 To be included to strengthen the existing Egyptian AC Code and remedy 
gaps in its coverage. 
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis and 
Findings. 
 
his chapter will discuss the results of the research study to determine the 
reliability of the proposed provisions needed for making the Code of Corporate 
Governance, Audit Committee section more practical and comprehensive.  
4-1 Hypotheses  
4-1-1 Hypothesis One. 
The first hypothesis relates to the establishment, resources and skills of 
the AC. The following elements should be evaluated to determine their 
importance for AC effectiveness.  
Allocating financial resources to the AC. Because of the huge responsibility that the AC 
undertakes, the BD should take into consideration the scope of work when allocating 
resources.. This factor includes the following issues: supplying the AC with adequate 
resources to undertake its duties; hiring independent counsel and other advisers to help 
the AC as necessary; and providing salary to AC members that takes into account the 
extra responsibilities, skills, duties and time produced by AC members. Therefore, AC 
members could get more salary compared with other BD members. 
Hiring skilled members of AC. In relation to designating skilled members for the AC, the 
AC members should have financial expertise with professional qualification. AC 
members’ training should be on a timely and ongoing basis and related to company 
bylaws with a focus on new AC members; and companies must have AC members who 
are financially literate or will become financially literate within a reasonable time after 
their appointment.   
AC’s Role and Establishment. AC members should be appointed by the BD on the 
recommendation of the Nomination Committee in consultation with AC Chairman. If any 
AC member serves in more than 3 listed companies, the BD should determine whether 
this situation will impair the ability of such AC member. Each member of AC should be 
responsible for announcing any potential conflict of interest in advance; there should be 
T 
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sufficient time between AC meetings and BD meetings to allow actions to be carried 
out; and AC meeting discussions should be documented and circulated to internal and 
external auditors as appropriate.  
Based upon the above modifications to the CG Code for the AC, the researcher 
proposes the following hypothesis:  
H1: There is a relationship between having sufficient funds, competent and skilled 
members of AC and transparency in the AC role and the effectiveness of the AC 
function. 
The hypothesis used the second, third and first groups of questions in the survey, as 
discussed below. (Appendix A includes a copy of the survey in Arabic and English.) 
4-1-2 Hypothesis Two. 
Hypothesis two relates to the financial reporting, internal control, whistle-
blowing and IAF. 
Internal Control. One of the main responsibilities of the AC is trying to guard the 
company from fraud. Such responsibility includes the need to be confident that the 
controls are in place and operating successfully. In addition, the AC should approve the 
statements in the annual report in relation to internal control and the management of 
risk. The AC should assess the company’s risk profile and support the preparation of a 
statement on internal control in the annual report. The AC should deter management 
override of internal controls and review annually the organization’s code of conduct; 
fraud must be reported to the AC by the CPA firm. The BD has one business day to 
notify the EFSA of suspected fraud, while the CPA firm is required to report to the EFSA 
by the end of the next business day.  
As to the Financial Reporting elements, first, the AC should review related information 
to financial statements due to a number of reasons. The BD’s approval is required and if 
AC is not satisfied with any aspect of the proposed financial reporting, AC shall report it 
to the BD.  
Whistle-Blowing policy is a new tool to handle complaints for Egyptian companies, 
which includes the following: AC is required by Whistle-Blowing to review any 
complaints received whether generated internally or externally, regarding internal 
controls and financial statements. Whistle-Blowing requires that anyone who wants to 
complain s/he should find the contact information of AC members on company’s 
website or call the hotline. Confidentiality of the employee and protection against any 
retribution should be guaranteed. The complainer should be able to follow the 
procedures the AC has established; and when performing an investigation the AC will 
determine the corrective action or recommend a course of actions to the full BD.  
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The Internal Audit function is one of the important departments in any company, which 
the AC supervises directly, and that makes it one of the most important tools for the AC 
to detect and fight fraud. The internal audit function should have a direct reporting 
relationship to the AC, which helps to create an agenda for the coming year or to 
approve the CAE’s agenda. Moreover, an adequately resourced internal audit function 
may provide the BD with an objective assurance of the internal control. AC should 
review IAF budget and plans and assess how such plans reflect CPA firm’s objectives. 
The AC should guarantee that the Internal Audit Function has resources and access to 
information and is fully equipped. Companies should perform an internal Improvement 
and Quality Assurance Program once every 5 years for the IAF. AC should meet 
annually with executive managers and CPA firm to discuss the performance of the CAE; 
and the AC ensures that internal auditor team has direct access to the BD’s chairman 
and is accountable to the AC. Based up on the discussion above, the role of the AC in 
relation to internal control, financial reporting, Whistle-Blowing and internal audit 
function, the researcher proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: There is a relationship between the degree of supervision of the company’s 
internal control system, financial reporting, Whistle-Blowing and internal audit 
function and the effectiveness of AC function.  
The hypothesis here was tested using the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth groups of 
questions in the survey.  
4-1-3 Hypothesis Three. 
The hypothesis relates to the relationship between the AC and BD, and to 
the communication with shareholders. 
The relation between AC and BD is critically important in order for the AC to do a better 
job. AC chairman should report formally to the BD on its proceedings after each 
meeting. The AC is an integral part of the corporate framework in helping to fulfill the 
BD’s stewardship responsibility to its stakeholders. AC gets formal Terms of Reference 
from the BD, which should be reviewed annually by the BD; disagreement between the 
AC and BD should be allocated enough time to be resolved, if not; AC should report the 
issue to the shareholders.  The AC must have a written charter that includes: annual 
performance evaluation, the purpose, etc. and the charter must be posted on the 
company’s website.  
Communication with Shareholders. AC is obligated toward this group to disclose the 
work done by the committee during the previous fiscal year in the annual report. AC 
should disclose in the annual report whether members of AC are satisfied with their 
responsibilities in fulfilling the charter, which should be attached to the annual report 
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every 3 years. The EFSA should have jurisdiction over reporting of information to the 
public; the terms of reference of the AC should be made available in the annual report 
and should include the number of AC meetings, summary of AC role, etc... The 
chairman of AC should be available at the Annual General Meeting to answer any 
question about AC. The annual report should include other matters concerning any 
disagreement between the AC and BD, the issue of appointing the CPA firm, provision 
of non-audit services and certain matters regarding the CPA firm.  
Taking into consideration the needed improvement between the AC and BD as well as 
improving communication with owners, the researcher proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: There is a relationship between the level of communication between the 
AC and both the BD and shareholders and the effectiveness of AC function. 
The hypothesis here was formulated using the fourth and eleventh groups of questions 
in the survey.  
4-1-4 Hypothesis Four. 
This hypothesis relates to the external audit and annual audit cycle. 
External Audit. AC is responsible for overseeing the organization’s relations with the 
CPA firm and the engagement letter should state that the client is the AC, so the CPA 
firm is accountable to the AC.  If the CPA firm resigns,  the AC should investigate and 
should consider the need to include the risk of the departure of their CPA firm in their 
risk evaluation. The AC should report to shareholders on the appointment, 
reappointment or removal of the CPA firm. If the BD does not accept AC’s 
recommendation, this should be disclosed in the annual report; AC should review the 
engagement letter with the executive partner at the start of each audit; AC evaluation 
should take into consideration the CPA firm’s qualifications and whether the audit fee is 
proper to the size, risk, complexity and control profile of the company. Moreover, 
annually the AC should review the CPA firm’s internal quality control, peer review, 
governmental inquiries and any steps taken to deal with such issues. AC should ensure 
follow up of the mandatory rotation taking place within the CPA firm with regard to the 
lead and other partners after five years and then apply a five-year time-out. The same 
rotation process also applies for non-audit services. The AC should agree with the BD 
on a policy for the employment of former employees of the CPA firm who were part of 
the audit team regarding direct moves from the CPA firm to the organization. In addition, 
AC should state in the annual report that the provision of any non-audit services did not 
harm the CPA firm’s independence and verify that it was not more than 5% of the total 
amount paid to the CPA firm and that AC approval was obtained. Furthermore, CPA 
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firms should be prohibited from providing certain non-audit services at the same time 
that they are performing audits, such as actuarial services, HR, etc...  
Annual Audit Cycle. The AC should consider whether the CPA firm’s overall work plan is 
consistent with the scope of the audit engagement; review it with the CPA firm, CFO 
and CAE, AC should review the audit plan and scope with the IAF team to assure the 
reduction of unnecessary efforts. There should be guidance necessitating that CPA firm 
gets from ACs their opinion of the quality, not just the acceptability, of the accounting 
principles used in the company. Moreover, AC must meet with management and the 
CPA firm to review the audited quarterly and annual financial statements. AC should 
review the CPA firm representation letters before signature by management, and also 
review management letters including the recommendations of CPA firm and 
management’s responses to those recommendations. At the end of the annual audit 
cycle, the AC assesses the effectiveness of the audit process, it should review whether 
CPA firm has met its audit plan and obtain feedback about the performance of the audit 
from key executives involved; and AC should discuss with the CPA firm any difficulties 
faced during the audit cycle and any major disagreements with management and 
ensure solution of disagreements regarding financial reporting. An accurate Annual 
Audit means that the AC function was effective in monitoring and reviewing the 
company’s system and processes.  
Taking into consideration the improvements proposed to the external audit and annual 
audit cycle, the researcher proposes the following hypothesis:  
 
H4: There is a relationship between the appropriate selection of the external 
auditor and the continued assessment of her/his duties and the effectiveness 
of the AC in monitoring the company’s operations. 
The hypothesis here was formulated using the ninth and tenth groups of questions in 
the survey.  
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4-2 Data Collection 
 
4-2-1 Introduction 
The research hypotheses will be examined using a survey presented to professionals 
involved in the auditing profession including AC members, auditors and accounting 
professors. Most of the auditors surveyed were from three leading accounting firms in 
Egypt:  Crowe, Dr. A. M. Hegazy & Co. and Ernst & Young, while the professors were 
from the Accounting Department at the American University in Cairo. The major concern 
in developing the sample was that all the participants should have background and 
some experience concerning the local auditing and business environment in Egypt. In 
this way, the researcher was able to solicit the opinions of different categories of 
participants to get a non-biased opinion, rather than narrowing participants to only the 
AC members.  The sample was purposive rather than random, as it was not possible to 
obtain a comprehensive list of accountants with corporate audit experience.  In addition, 
it was necessary to select firms with which the researcher and his advisors had a 
relationship in order to obtain their cooperation. 
 
4-2-2 Characteristics  
The survey used Likert scales, which are used widely for assessing strength of 
agreement or disagreement. Likert scales contain statements expressing favorable or 
unfavorable opinion or attitude toward the purpose of interest (Cooper & Schindler, 
2008, p. 308). The sample’s participants are asked, for example, if they agree or 
disagree with each statement; expressing each answer using a scale,  often from one to 
five, to reflect the degree of acceptance or rejection. The data produced by this scale 
are considered Ordinal.  
The researcher assessed the opinion of the participants concerning the provisions he 
proposed, and whether they will contribute to good CG in Egypt. The researcher formed 
two kinds of questions for the survey: 
A Central questions:  these ask for an opinion on a crucial concept or 
phenomenon related to the research and linked to the specific sub-
questions; these were used to narrow down hypotheses to be established on 
certain variables (Creswell, 2009, p. 129).      
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B Sub-questions: these questions relate to a central idea or question, 
developing it in more detail to explore important issues relative to the central 
question. 
The Survey was distributed using two means: 
1. Paper and pencil questionnaires, (surveys), the traditional method. 
2. Internet survey through a website tool, called “Free Online Surveys.” This 
method called computer-assisted data collection (CADAC) or computer–
assisted survey information collection (CASIC). This approach provides 
more anonymity than the previous one (Cooper & Schindler, 2008, p. 224).  
This research is a mixed method of research questions and hypotheses study that 
concentrate not only on the quantitative method, but also, on the qualitative. A 
combination of the two offers the best assessment of the research hypotheses and 
questions.  
The purpose of the questionnaire is to measure the opinion of the respondents to the 
proposed provisions of a revised Egyptian corporate governance code with respect to 
the audit function. For more details, please see Appendix A and Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
 
4-2-3 The Survey Participants  
The bars shown below summarize the answers of the 54 participants  who fully 
answered all the questions. Each bar below represents the answers for a specific 
question. The figure below shows the frequency distribution for the 53 code provisions 
proposed by the researcher, as below in Figure 2.     
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4-2-4 Test and Data  
Responses to the survey were recorded, exported in a spreadsheet, and transferred to 
SPSS, a statistical software package, for in depth analysis. The researcher used two 
types of data analysis, descriptive analysis and statistical analysis.  
 
4-2-4-1 Descriptive Analysis  
The researcher used a central tendency measurement, generally the mean, to 
assess the average degree of responses by the participants to each question. In 
order to compare the spread of data between variables (questions), the coefficient 
of variation (CV) was used as it generates values that can be easily compared. 
The independence from units of measurement provided by the coefficient of 
variation allows measures to be compared to each other in ways that other 
measures, such as standard deviations, make more difficult. The smaller the 
coefficient of variation the smaller the relative spread of the data (Hegazy & 
Hegazy, 2010, p. 41). The researcher analyzed that information and gave possible 
explanations and interpretations when evident.  
4-2-4-2 Statistical Analysis    
The researcher also used the SPSS to generate Spearman’s correlations and to 
create a correlation matrix, in order to investigate and analyze the relations 
between the question groups for each hypothesis. With Cronbach’s alpha tool the 
researcher tested the reliability and the validity for the proposed provisions. The 
reliability test measures the internal consistency of an assessment by comparing 
the answers to related questions. This measurement indicates the extent to which 
reliability is without bias (free of error) and offers consistent measurements of 
variables, while the validity test measures the strength of our proposition, 
inferences or conclusions. This measurement will provide the expected score of 
variables in the same domain even if the domain is diverse. These tools were used 
to identify possible explanations for the responses.   
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4-3 Descriptive Analysis Results  
Testing Hypothesis “1” 
H1 included three groups of questions; their descriptive information is depicted in the 
following table.  
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for H1 
Q # Description Mean CV Q # Description Mean CV 
q1.1     Appointment 4.02 24.9% q2.1 Adequate resources 4.46 16.7% 
q1.2 Duration 3.93 28.4% q2.2 Counsel 4.07 23.8% 
q1.3 Serve in 3 Co.s 3.87 29.3% q2.3 Salary 3.63 29.9% 
q1.4 Conflict of Interests 4.50 15.4% Q2 Resources 4.05 15.9% 
q1.5 Time of meeting 4.39 13.6% q3.1 AC Expert 4.43 15.6% 
q1.6 Circulation  4.20 19.3% q3.2 Training 4.31 14.8% 
Q1 Establishment 4.15 13.6% q3.3 Literacy  4.13 23.5% 
   Q3 Skills 4.29 14.4% 
 
The table above includes the mean and coefficient of variation for each construct 
developed to test the first hypothesis.  The mean reflects that the responses for all three 
of the main variables tested -- Establishment, Resources and Skills – were concentrated 
in the agree area as shown in the table below.   
Table 2 Answers Interpretation table 
Range Interpretation 
1     – 1.79 Strongly Disagree 
1.8  – 2.59 Disagreed 
2.6  - 3.39 Neutral  
3.4 – 4.19 Agree 
4.2 – 5  Strongly Agree 
 
The mean results for group question 1 (Q1) “Establishment and Role” ranged between 
4.5 to 3.87, that denotes that all the population of the sample answered as [Agree and 
Strongly Agree] on the majority of question, find the interpretation in table 2; because 
3.87 was the lowest mean in the Q1, which scored more than 3.4 the lower range of the 
[Agree] option. Similar results were found in Q2 “Resources” but the lowest (worst) 
mean was for question (q2.3) “Salary level for AC members could be higher than the BD 
members”, Q3 scored the highest mean of all the question groups for H1 with a total of 
4.2. At the same time, all the questions in Q3 “Skills and Experience” scored more than 
4.  
Table 2 shows the study scale for the sample, 
means categorized according to the Likert 
scale used in the survey. It shows the highest 
and lowest parameters, dictated by the 
researcher in the questionnaire (survey).  
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The CV score for the Variable Q1 total was 
the lowest, compared with the rest two 
Variables of H1, indicating greater agreement 
on this variable. In this measure, the score is 
better when the percentage is smaller and the 
responses more widely spread as the CV 
rises. A threshold of 50% was set as the 
maximum acceptable CV.  As shown in table 
1, none of the questions in the H1 groups 
reached the 50% threshold, and that indicates 
that the participants were highly clustered in 
their answers. The highest (worst) score was 
also for q2.3 “AC members could get more 
salary than BD members”. The five questions 
within Q1 are ranked according to the tightness of the response in Figure 3.  
 
From the above two measurements, the researcher concludes that all nine provisions 
were supported by the participants. In addition, participants’ answers were most 
concentrated for Variables Q1, Q2 and Q3.  
 
Testing Hypothesis “2” 
H2 included four groups of questions.  The results are summarized in the following 
table.  
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for H2 
Q # Description Mean CV Q # Description Mean CV 
q5.1 Related Info. 4.46 14.9% q8.1 Direct relation  4.31 24.6% 
q5.2 Report to BD 4.44 12.9% q8.2 Resourced 4.19 19.2% 
Q5 Financial Rep. 4.45 11.6% q8.3 Budget & plan 4.37 17.9% 
q6.1 AC approval 4.54 14.7% q8.4 Info 4.41 15.0% 
q6.2 Examine cont  4.46 14.2% q8.5 Not victim 4.37 17.9% 
q6.3 Override  4.39 17.9% q8.6 Quality assurance 4.30 17.3% 
q6.4 Fraud 4.11 23.5% q8.7 Access to BD 4.26 17.8% 
Q6 Internal control 4.37 12.6% Q8 IAF 4.31 13.3% 
q7.1 Complaints 4.24 21.5%  
q7.2 Info. 4.17 23.2%    
q7.3 Action 4.20 16.9%    
Q7 Whistle-Blow 4.20 17.5%    
As shown in table 3, most of the mean scores for the questions for H2 are above 4.2 
mean score, which indicates a [Strongly Agree] answer by most of the participants on 
Figure 3 Ranking of questions in group 1 
according to CV score 
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these groups, according to the scale in table 2. Only q6.4 “Fraud reporting to EFSA”, 
q7.2 “complainers should find AC members information”, and q8.2 “resourced IAF could 
provide the BD with objective assurance”, fall below the 4.2 threshold, which places 
them in the Agree area. No question scored a mean with a neutral or below.  
 
The CV scores for all of the questions of H2 were below 25%, indicating a high degree 
of agreement among the respondents. Such results signify the acceptance by most of 
the participants in H2. The scores for H2 are highly clustered on Strongly Agree with the 
proposed provisions. The total CV of Q5 “Financial Reporting” is the lowest among the 
questions for H2 and all the other Variables, while q5.2 “if the AC is not satisfied with 
management’s financial reporting, it shall report it to the BD” gives the lowest (best) CV 
score out of all the 53 questions. This implies that the respondents were most unified 
about Q5, while the total CV of Q7 “Whistle-Blowing” has the highest score among all 
the variables, which indicates that this procedure has the widest variation among the 
respondents, perhaps due to the nonexistence of such procedures in Egypt. Still, all the 
groups have a low CV, which implies that the participants agreed collectively about 
most of the provisions proposed in H2 for inclusion in for Egypt Code of CG for AC.  
 
Testing Hypothesis “3” 
H3 included two groups of questions; their descriptive information are depicted in the 
following table.  
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics For H3 
Q # Description Mean CV Q # Description Mean CV 
q4.1 Report to BD 4.43 17.3% q11.1 Report responsibility 4.31 18.5% 
q4.2 Terms of ref. 4.06 24.6% q11.2 Annual report 4.33 17.9% 
q4.3 Disagre AC&BD 4.19 18.6% q11.3 AC chairman 4.57 14.5% 
q4.4 Charter 4.19 20.8% q11.4 Other matters 4.28 20.5% 
Q4 AC & BD 4.21 14.2% Q11 Com. shareholders 4.37 13.5% 
 
As shown in Ttable 4, the means for all all the answers fall within the range defined as is 
approximately [Strongly Agree] according to table 2 above  Questions , considering that 
q4.3, “disagreement between the AC and BD,” and q4.4, “AC must have a written 
Charter,” are close to the ≅ 4.2 cutoff,  however only one question, q4.2, “AC get formal 
terms of reference by the BD,” is in the [Agree] category. While for, Q11, 
“communication with shareholders,” answers show a high degree of questions are 
unanimity around [Strongly Agree]. In general, the sample population approved all the 
proposed provisions of CG for H3. The total mean for Q11 is higher than for in Q4, “AC 
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relation with BD”. Reflecting the small differences between the degrees of preference 
between the two groups.     
One out of four questions in Q11, “communication with shareholders,” surpassed the 
20% CV score and two questions in Q4, “AC relation with BD”. That reflects the general 
high level of concurrence in the responses. Q11.3, “AC chairman should attend AGM” 
was the lowest (best) CV score in the two variables and q4.4, “AC must have a written 
charter,” was the highest (worst) CV score. The total Q11 CV score is slightly better 
than Q4.  
 
 Testing Hypothesis “4” 
H4 included two groups of questions; their descriptive information is depicted in the 
following table.  
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics for H4 
Q # Description Mean CV Q # Description Mean CV 
q9.1 Observe CPA 3.33 43.2% q10.1 CPA plan 4.07 24.2% 
q9.2 CPA resign 4.31 17.3% q10.2 Unnecessary effort 4.17 21.2% 
q9.3 CPA appoint  3.91 23.5% q10.3 CPA opinion 3.61 37.0% 
q9.4 Engage. Letter 3.52 31.6% q10.4 Review audit 4.41 13.6% 
q9.5 AC evaluation 4.24 18.9% q10.5 Represent letters 4.20 19.3% 
q9.6 CPA perform. 4.24 20.5% q10.6 End of audit  3.85 30.0% 
q9.7 Rotation 4.26 18.3% q10.7 Difficulties 4.44 16.2% 
q9.8 Former CPAs 3.91 25.0% Q10 Audit cycle   4.10 14.4% 
q9.9 Non-audit 4.06 22.7%  
q9.10 Prohibit N-A 4.24 21.0%    
Q9 External Aud   4.0 12.3%   
 
As shown in table 5 above, the mean score in Q9 “External Audit” was as follows: 
 Five questions in the Strongly Agree category; 
 Four questions in the Agree category; and 
 One question (q9.1) “engagement letter should state that CPA is accountable to 
the AC” in the Don’t Know category (equivalent to a neutral opinion).  
The only Variable to have such a wide distribution in responses and the only variable to 
have a neutral category question was Q9 “External Audit.” However, it is the only one 
out of ten that did not reach the cutoff for Agree shown in Table 2, and, indeed, was the 
only question out of 53 that did not reach at least the “Agree” level of support! The 
participants did not reject the proposed provisions but only demonstrated neutrality or 
perhaps had not made up their mind about this provision. Q10, “Annual Audit Cycle,” 
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received support similar to the other groups, with approximately 60% in the Agree 
category and 40% in the Strongly Agree category. Therefore, Q9 and Q10 received an 
approval from the participants on most of the questions, although one received neither 
support nor rejection.  
As could be seen in Table 5, group Q9 included the highest (worst) CV score for a 
single question among all 11 groups, with q9.1 “the engagement letter with the CPA firm 
should state that the client is the AC,” having the highest CV score out of all 53 
questions, indicating the least agreement. q10.6 “at the end of the annual audit cycle, 
the AC assesses the effectiveness of the audit process” has also one of the highest CV 
scores. With all this in mind, the two groups retain low CV total scores, with 4 questions 
having more than 30% CV score representing 3 out of the 17 H4 questions. That 
denotes that participants were somewhat less united about their responses concerning 
H4 questions.     
Finally, none of the CV scores reached the threshold 50%, which indicates that all the 
participants were consistent in their answers among all of the provisions and in different 
groups. 52 out of 53 provisions were assessed as Strongly Agree or Agree, by the 
majority of the participants and only one provision was in the neutral category, which 
implies the acceptance of 98% of the provisions by the sample population.  
4-4 Statistical Analysis Results  
Testing Hypothesis “1” 
 
    Table 6 Correlation Coefficient H1 
Spearman Q1 Q2 Q3 
Q1 Establishment & Role 
     Sig  
1.000 
            - 
0.218 
          0.113 
0.377** 
          0.005 
Q2 Resources 
     Sig 
0.218 
          0.113 
1.000 
            - 
0.087 
         0.533 
Q3 Skills & Experience 
     Sig 
0.377** 
          0.005 
0.087 
         0.533 
1.000 
            - 
Sig= Significance. 
As shown in the matrix above, there is no correlation between the first group of 
questions Q1 “Role and Establishment” and the second group of questions Q2 
“Resources.”  The degree of significance does not meet the 0.05 threshold.  Variables 
shown with two stars in the SPSS output meet this threshold. The same thing could be 
said about the correlation between Q2 and Q3 “Skills and Experience”, 0.533 > 0.05, so 
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there is no statistically significant relation between them.  On the other hand, there is a 
relation between Q1 and Q3.  In this case, the CV analysis did not support the H1. 
Table 7 Cronbach's Alpha test for H1 
Question Groups Reliability Validity 
Q1  Establishment and Role 0.674 0.821 
Q2  Resources 0.424 0.651 
Q3  Skills & Experience 0.701 0.838 
The rule of thumb for the Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.70 or higher of reliability for a 
substantial sample (Experiment-Resources.com, 2010). However, in social science 
realm it should be more than 0.60.  It is evident from the results shown in Table 7 that 
only variable Q2 did not pass the threshold. The variable Q2 “Resources” has the 
lowest reliability score between H1 variables and all the other variables.  It is obvious 
from the table above, those variables, Q1 ”Establishment” and Q3 “skills” reliability 
scores passed the threshold.   
The rule of thumb for the Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.83 or higher for a positive assessment 
of the validity of the data, for a substantial sample. However, in social science realm it 
should be around 0.80 for more moderate considerations. For the validity test, two out 
of three passed the Cronbach’s Alpha’s threshold, and only Q2 variable did not pass. 
This supports a conclusion that Q1 and Q3 have strong support from the accounting 
professionals in the sample, lending support to H1, but they do not generally agree on 
the need for resources to support the AC.    The reasons for this lack of support deserve 
further exploration and analysis.  Overall, however, the first hypothesis is supported. 
 
Testing Hypothesis “2” 
 
Table 8 Correlation Coefficient H2 
Spearman Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
Q5 Financial Reporting 
     Sig  
1.000 
            - 
0.515** 
         .000 
0.579** 
       0.000 
0.478** 
       0.000 
Q6 Internal Control 
     Sig 
0.515** 
          000 
1.000 
            - 
0.558** 
         .000 
0.664** 
       0.000 
Q7 Whistle-Blowing 
     Sig 
0.579** 
         
0.000 
0.558** 
          
.000 
1.000 
            - 
0.662** 
       0.000 
Q8 Internal Audit Function 
     Sig 
0.478** 
       0.000 
0.664** 
         .000 
0.662** 
       0.000 
1.000 
            - 
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As seen from above matrix, Q5, “Financial Reporting”, Q6, “Internal Control”, Q7, 
“Whistle-Blowing,” and Q8, “IAF,” all have strong relationships linking them together. 
Therefore, the researcher believes that H2 is supported.  
Table 9 Cronbach's Alpha test for H2 
Question Groups Reliability Validity 
Q5  Financial Reporting 0.558 0.747 
Q6  Internal Control 0.681 0.825 
Q7  Whistle-Blowing 0.798 0.894 
Q8  Internal Audit Function 0.835 0.914 
 
It is clear from table 9 above, that 3 out of 4 variables passed the reliability test, while 
Q5 variable failed the test because it did not reach the threshold.  
At the same time, 3 out of 4 variables passed the validity test, Q5 “Financial Reporting” 
also did not pass. The financial reporting provisions were not as strongly supported as 
the other elements, but overall the hypothesis was supported. 
 
Testing Hypothesis “3” 
Table 10 Correlation Coefficient H3 
Spearman Q4 Q11 
Q4 AC relation with BD 
     Sig  
1.000 
            - 
0.655** 
          0.000 
Q11 Communication with Shareholders 
     Sig 
0.655** 
          0.000 
1.000 
            - 
 
As seen in Table 10, there is a relationship between Q4, “AC relation with BD” and Q11, 
“Communication with shareholders”. The relationship points to the integral role of the 
BD and shareholders in the entity’s internal control. This hypothesis is supported.  
 
Table 11 Cronbach's Alpha test for H3 
Question Groups Reliability Validity 
Q4    AC relation with BD  0.649 0.806 
Q11  Communication with Shareholders 0.748 0.865 
 
As seen in table 11 above, two variables passed the reliability test, although one of 
them only at the moderate level (Q4).  This supports a conclusion that these measures 
are likely to be valid and reliable as measures of the opinion of accounting professionals 
on these issues.  
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Both Q4 and Q11 passed the validity test.  This indicates that H3 Is also supported. 
 
Testing Hypothesis “4” 
 
Table 12 Correlation Coefficient H4 
Spearman Q9 Q10 
Q9  External Audit  
     Sig  
1.000 
            - 
0.431** 
          0.000 
Q10  Annual Audit Cycle 
     Sig 
0. 431** 
          0.000 
1.000 
            - 
 
As shown in Table 12, there is a significant degree of correlation between Q9 “External 
Audit” and Q10 “Annual Audit Cycle”. The researcher believes that this relation confirms 
the deep involvement of CPA firm in the annual audit cycle. The findings support H4. 
 
Table 13 Cronbach's Alpha test for H4 
Question Groups Reliability Validity 
Q9    External Audit 0.681 0.826 
Q10  Annual Audit Cycle 0.728 0.853 
 
As seen in table 13 above, Q9, “External Audit,” and Q10, “Annual Audit Cycle,” both 
pass the Cronbach’s Alpha of reliability and validity tests. Therefore, the findings for 
both of the variables strongly support H4. 
SUMMARY 
 
In this part of the thesis, the researcher explored the study’s four hypotheses in detail using a survey of 
accounting professionals.  A questionnaire made up of 53 questions using a Likert scale assessed the 
support of the sample members for each of the hypotheses. The survey was distributed among auditors in 
two CPA firms and professors of accounting, both manually and electronically. The SPSS software package 
was used to analyze the data.   The results were demonstrated in two parts: descriptive analysis and 
statistical analysis. In both of the two parts, the four hypothesis results were reviewed and analyzed. All the 
hypotheses were supported by the descriptive analysis, while H1 was the only hypothesis that was not fully 
supported in the statistical analysis 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions, Limitations 
and Recommendations. 
 
Conclusions 
The results from Chapter 4 support the acceptance of all four hypotheses. However, the 
Coefficient of Variation element of the statistical analysis did not support all components 
of H1. On the other hand, the statistical analysis, in general, supported all four 
hypotheses. 
The survey findings demonstrate that many knowledgeable participants in corporate 
governance in Egypt favor updating the current CG Code in Egypt in relation to the AC 
provisions. Nearly all of the provisions proposed were accepted by 98% of those 
surveyed. Only one provision received enough disagreements to lower the mean rating 
below the threshold for “agree.” this indicates the appropriateness of most of the 
proposed provisions to the CG Code of Egypt. 
AC Charter gives the AC members a roadmap of what they should do, so adoption of 
the proposed measures will help everyone in the committee do a better job according to 
the best practice. The Charter is an important document that provides details about the 
day-to-day activity of AC and provides a plan that will help in measuring AC 
performance. The charter will also help in setting and evaluating the powers and duties 
of the AC, which is the responsibility of the entire BD. 
The new provisions will provide audit practitioners with guidance on good practice in 
doing their jobs. If these provisions are adopted by the EFSA, they will develop CG 
practice and commitment in Egypt and will place the local CG Code on a higher level  
relative to international standards. The new provisions will help the AC and 
consequently the BD to monitor the performance of executive directors and branch 
managers especially in large companies that hire hundreds of employees.  
Moreover, these provisions will help in building better-governed listed companies. 
Effective CG has the potential to increase shareholder value. Many foreign and 
international capital investors will be willing to pay a premium for entities with better 
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internal controls and clearer financial disclosure. The new provisions will help in 
developing the quality of disclosure by mandating the CPA firm to express an opinion on 
the quality of accounting principles used by the company, which is vital to enhance the 
disclosure for shareholders and in particular for foreign investors who demand more 
sound and transparent CG practice.  By encouraging investment, these practices will 
support the survival and growth of the company. A more effective AC has the potential 
to attract more investments due to the management’s enhanced and improved 
capacities, and may result in reduction in the risk factors associated with financial and 
control elements.  
Furthermore, the proposed modification to the AC Code will offer a more efficient and 
smooth audit process to the company and the CPA firm. The new provisions will help 
the AC members to have greater and more complete control over managing the scope 
of the audit. ACs will need to work to achieve such control, even if it would come into 
conflict with management’s goals. 
Also, the new provisions will help the AC to be more active in searching for immediate 
remedies to control weaknesses. AC members will be in a position ot carry out 
discussions with the external auditor to identify remedies for control weak nesses. 
Having a more reliable AC will result in a better internal audit function, a function that is 
underutilized by many companies in relying totally on the CPA firm.  Looking to the 
internal audit function as more vital to the entity’s success will lead to the appropriation 
of more budget to the internal audit function in line with the company’s risk profile, 
especially in time of economic crises. These provisions will push the BD to be more 
involved in the process of hiring internal audit employees with better qualifications and 
this will boost the internal audit function to be a better department in managing the 
reporting and financial responsibilities effectively. 
The disclosure of the appointment of the CPA firm in the annual report, the evaluation of 
the CPA firm for its capability to do the job considering the complexity and size of the 
company, setting the level of payment to different officers in the CPA firm, and studying 
the quality control of the CPA firm will help the AC to have an inside look on the auditor 
and build a better picture of its status. All these provisions will help in making sure that 
the independence of the CPA firm is valid. 
Providing new provisions about non-audit services will clear away a lot of the 
vagueness surrounding non-audit services for many AC members in the Egyptian 
companies.  It will also provide a further detailed description of these services, which 
will help the AC in understanding the kind of services regarded as non-audit services. 
These provisions will be a significant technical addition to the local AC Code in making it 
more user friendly, which will motivate the AC members to practice and push for more 
CG effectiveness. 
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Adding new provisions concerning the earnings is important due to the urgent need for 
such a provision in Egypt because of the problem facing EGX-listed firms, especially in 
that interim reports from the AC are due one month earlier than the financial reports.  
It is important to disclose in the annual report the AC’s work to all the stakeholders. 
Other important issues include the disagreement between the BD and AC, which should 
be revealed especially if the disagreement was not solved until the time of the AGM.  
These issues will help the AC to be a more transparent committee and will result in 
more effective CG practice.   
Limitations  
Due to the nature of the probability sample, the results cannot be generalized.  
The respondents were only 54, which is a relatively small sample size for a population 
that would include all experienced auditors in the large CPA firms and accounting 
faculty at the 20 public and 29 private universities.  Given the high degree of agreement 
within the sample, this may not be a limiting factor. 
The proposed provisions are taken from codes established for corporations in 
developed economies, which may raise some issues with respect to differences in the 
regulatory or corporate frameworks between capital markets in the UK and USA 
compared with Egypt.  
The researcher made his analysis of the content of US and UK Codes, which was 
subjective and may have ignored issues of importance to AC tools. The assessment of 
the researcher to the contents of US, UK and Egypt Codes as being Very Detailed, 
Briefed or only Detailed is highly subjective and the research of such analysis may differ 
if another researcher makes it. 
In the statistical analysis, of the study, Q2 "Resources” did not pass the Cronbach’s 
Alpha test for either the reliability or validity test. The same variable did not have a 
significant level of correlation as a variable in H1 as measured by its correlation with the 
other two variables, Q1,”Establishment and Role,” and Q3, “Skills and Experience.” Q5, 
“Financial Reporting,” did not pass the reliability and Validity tests, but did support H2. 
Recommendations 
A more effective AC means more stability and resistance to economic shocks. The idea 
of having more investments in the economy to generate more jobs for the community is 
the main goal of the Egyptian government. With the current Global Economic Crisis, an 
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effective AC will boost the local economy against future drastic outcomes by 
empowering CG. 
A more effective AC could aid Egypt’s economy by empowering the local investing 
environment and sustaining high rates of economic growth. Moreover, it will add value 
to the company not only from inside, but also on the outside among the customers and 
business partners, based on more transparent disclosure and better internal control. 
It will give the company the legal framework to hire an accounting advisor/counsel from 
outside the company; the new provisions will refine and legitimize the practice.  
Assessing CPA firm independence using government or professional authority 
resources is vital for a country like Egypt to avoid future scandals. Independence is a 
vital issue in the CG exercise, which will be an important technical addition to the 
Egyptian Code to make it more professionally useable for the ACs. 
One of the major responsibilities of the committee is to uncover fraud; the company 
needs effective arrangements and antifraud tools to fight corruption and wrongdoing. 
This sheds light on the most important responsibilities of the AC, that is, the prevention 
of fraud. At the same time, the internal audit function may not be sufficient, which puts 
more responsibilities on the AC members. This may require hiring more competent and 
experienced internal audit staff, and providing for more funds and systems to improve 
performance of the internal audit. One of the major tools to detect fraud is through 
building a system (Whistle Blowing) that handles the reporting of misconduct in the 
company. 
For a sound CG practice the AC should practice oversight of the internal audit function 
and build a direct positive relation with it; this will positively affect the internal control. 
Having a powerful AC will help in building a more reliable and active internal audit 
department. IAF is a vital CG tool. The increase in discussions about the company’s 
internal controls between executive managers and AC members will have a positive 
impact on the financial reporting and on fighting fraud. 
Egypt does not have detailed regulations that prohibit auditing/accounting firms from 
simultaneously auditing and providing accounting services for the same company, so 
adopting the new provisions will increase the transparency of CPA firms in Egypt.  
There will be a need to review the AC Code in Egypt every 3 -5 years against the 
literature and practice to add or delete provisions as needed. CG regulations must be 
evaluated continuously in order to ensure that they do not fall back and allow fraudulent 
practices to take place. 
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The Egyptian CG society should adopt, as much as possible, those provisions to 
improve the BD’s performance of their duties in overseeing  management and reporting 
any misconduct directly to shareholders.  
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 ثهعحأٝاكن  اُهؽذ
لا  أٝاكن
 أػؽف
لا 
 إٝاكن
أػبؼٌ 
 ثهعح
 اللجنت في الرقابت دورالتأسيس و  .1
 ؟ك٢ ر٘ل٤ػ أػٔبُٜب إقزوؽاؼًاأًثؽ  رٌٕٞ ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخإٔ َٛ رؼزوع إٔ إَبكخ ا ُج٘ٞظ ا ُزبُ٤خ قٞف ٣كبػع ػِ٠ 
      .ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخث٘بًء ػِ٠ رٞي٤خ ٖٓ ُد٘خ اُزؽن٤سبد ٝثبُزهبٝؼ ٓغ ؼئ٤ف  أػُبء اُِد٘خثزؼ٤٤ٖ  ٓدِف الإظاؼحه٤بّ  1-1
      .ق٘ٞاد هبثِخ ُِزدع٣ع ُلزؽر٤ٖ كوّ 3رؿ٣ع ػٖ  ُٔعح لا ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخإٔ ٣زْ رؼ٤٤ٖ أػُبء  2-1
ٓدِف الإظاؼح ثعؼاقخ ٝرو٤٤ْ إٕ ٛػٙ  َٛ هبّنؽًبد، ف 3٣زُٞ٠ ٗلف أًُ٘ت ك٢ أًثؽ ٖٓ  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخإغا ًبٕ أ١ ػُٞ ك٢  3-1
 .ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ ك٠ اُؽهبثخ؟ُٖ رُؼق هعؼح  اُسبُخ
  
   
      .إٔ ٣جبظؼ ُلإثلاؽ ػٖ أ١ رُبؼة ٓسزَٔ ك٢ أًُبُر ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخػِ٠ ًَ ػُٞ ٖٓ  4-1
      .  ؼاداهؽد ًبف ُز٘ل٤ػ اٍُكٔبذ ثٞمٍ خِف الإظاؼحاخزٔبػبد ّٝ خ٘خ أُؽاخؼخٍ خزٔبػبدإ إٔ ٣ٌٕٞ ٛ٘بى ٝهذ ًبف ث٤ٖ َؽٝؼح 5-1
      .اُعاضِ٢ زكت اُُؽٝؼح ؼاخغٝاُْ ٓؽاهت اُسكبثبدٖٝٓ ثْ رؼٔ٤ٜٔب ػِ٠  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخإخزٔبػبد  ٣دت إٔ ٣زْ رٞث٤ن أػٔبٍ 6-1
 المىارد .2
  ؟ثًٞؼح أًثؽ كؼبُ٤خ ٜٓبٜٓب لأظاء ُِد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ ٝكؽ رٔٞ٣َ ًبٍف١رؼزوع إٔ إَبكخ ا ُج٘ٞظ ا ُزبُ٤خ قٞف  َٛ
      .أُٞاؼظ اٌُبك٤خ ُلآَلاع ثٞاخجبرٜبة ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ إٓعاظإٔ ٣زْ  1-2
      .اُُؽٝؼحػ٘ع  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ  ُٔكبػعحٖٓ ضبؼج اُهؽًخ  ٓكزهبؼ٣ٖة الاقزؼبٗخ 2-2
 أُٜبؼاد ٝأُٜبّ الإَبك٤خ ،الإػزجبؼ أُكؤُٝ٤بد ػ٤ٖ٣دت إٔ ٣ؤضػ ة أُؽاخؼخ خ٘خأُٔ٘ٞزخ ُـَ ٌٓبكآد ٝاُجعلاداٍإٕ ٓكزٟٞ  3-2
 .ٓدِف الإظاؼحػِ٠ ؼارت أػِ٠ ٖٓ ػُٞ  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخٝػِ٤ٚ كٖٔ أٌُٖٔ إٔ ٣سًَ ػُٞ . أُؽرجٓخ ثؤٗهٓخ اُِد٘خ
    
 
 والخبرة المهاراث .3
 ؟أظاء ا ُِد٘خ َٛ رؼزوع إٔ إَبكخ ا ُج٘ٞظ ا ُزبُ٤خ قٞف ٣سكٖ
ٓدِف ثبلإَبكخ إُ٠ اُطجؽح أُسبقج٤خ ُ٤زْ إضز٤بؼٙ ٖٓ هجَ  زبيَ ػِ٠ رؤٛ٤َ ٜٓ٘٢أُبُ٢  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخضج٤ؽ  ًٕٞ٣دت إٔ ١ 1-3
 .الإظاؼح
     
ك٢ ٝهذ ٓ٘بقت ٝثهٌَ ٓكزٔؽ ٝغٝ يِخ ثبُِٞائر اُعاضِ٤خ ُِهؽًخ ٓغ اُزؽً٤ؿ  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ٣دت إٔ ٣ٌٕٞ رعؼ٣ت أػُبء  2-3
 .ػِ٠ الأػُبء اُدعظ
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ك٢ ؿُٕٞ كزؽح ؾٓ٘٤خ ٓؼوُٞخ ثؼع  ٝ ق٤ًجسٕٞ ًػُيا ُد٘خ ٓؽاخؼخ ُع٣ْٜ ٖٓ اُطجؽح أُسبقج٤خ٣دت إٔ رُْ اُهؽًخ أػُبء  3-3
 .رؼ٤٤ْٜ٘
     
 بمجلس الإدارة مراجعتعلاقت لجنت ال .4
 ٝرؼبٕٝ أًثؽ ٓغ ثؼُْٜ ا ُجؼٍ؟ أُدِف ٝاُِد٘خ ػِ٠ اُؼَٔ ثٌلبءح رؼزوع إٔ إَبكخ ا ُج٘ٞظ ا ُزبُ٤خ قٞف ٣كبػع َٛ
ح ٓسبَؽ الإخزٔبػبد ٝثؼع ًَ خِكخ آضػ٣ٖ ك٢ ػٖ ًبف إُ٠ ٓدِف الإظاؼحإٔ ٣ؽكغ روؽ٣ؽًا ؼقٔ٤ًب  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخػِ٠ ؼئ٤ف  1-4
ثهٌَ ًبَٓ ُِٞكبء ثٔكؤُٝ٤بد ًٝبُزٚ ػٖ  ٓدِف الإظاؼحٛ٢ خؿء ٌَٓٔ ُٜ٤ٌَ اُهؽًخ ك٢ ٓكبػعح  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ الاػزجبؼ إٔ
 .ًَ أيسبة أًُِسخ
     
      .ٝاُػ١ ٣دت إٔ ٣ؼ٤ع اُ٘ظؽ ك٤ٜب ق٘ٞ٣ًب ٓدِف الإظاؼحرسًَ ػِ٠ ًبكخ إضزًبيبرٜب ؼقٔ٤ًب ٖٓ  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ 2-4
إٔ رجِؾ أُكبٛٔ٤ٖ  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ، ٝإلا كؼِ٠ ٝٓدِف الإظاؼح ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخث٤ٖ  أ٣خ ضلاكبد٣دت إٔ ٣طًى ٝهذ ًبٍف ُسَ  3-4
 .ثػُي
     
ػِ٠ ٓٞهغ  ٓزٞكؽًا ًٕٞ١إٔ ٝأُ٤ثبم ٣دت . اُص...اُٜعف ،رو٤٤ْ الأظاء اُك٘ٞ١ : ٣دت إٔ ٣ٌٕٞ ُِد٘خ ٓ٤ثبم ٌٓزٞة ٣هَٔ اُزبُ٢ 4-4
 .لإْلاع أُكبٛٔ٤ٖ ٝالأْؽاف اُطبؼخ٤خ الأضؽٟ اُهؽًخ ػِ٠ الاٗزؽٗذ
     
 التقارير الماليت .5
 ؟اُهؽًخَٛ رؼزوع إٔ إَبكخ ا ُج٘ٞظ ا ُزبُ٤خ قٞف ٣سكٖ ٖٓ الإكًبذ ك٢ 
      . ثبُوٞائْ أُبُ٤خ أًٝلا هجَ ٓٞاكوخ أُدِف ػِ٤ٜب ٣٘جـ٢ إٔ ركزؼؽٌ اُِد٘خ أُؼِٞٓبد غاد اًُِخ 1-5
روعّ   ؿ٤ؽ ؼاَ٤خ ػٖ أ١ خبٗت ٖٓ خٞاٗت اُزوبؼ٣ؽ أُبُ٤خ أُوزؽزخ ٖٓ خبٗت الإظاؼح ، كئٕ ػِ٤ٜب إٔ خ٘خ أُؽاخؼخٍإغا ًبٗذ  2-5
 . ٓدِف الإظاؼح لارطبغ اُوؽاؼ أُ٘بقت ك٠ ٛػا اُهؤٕ روؽ٣ؽا إُ٠
     
 الرقابت الذاخليت .6
 ؟ػِ٠ ٗسٞ أًثؽ كؼبُ٤خ ثبُوٞائْ أُبُ٤خؿم ٝاُزلاػت اٍَٛ رؼزوع إٔ إَبكخ ا ُج٘ٞظ ا ُزبُ٤خ قٞف ٣كبػع ا ُِد٘خ ك٢ ٌٓبكسخ 
  ٝرؼَٔ ث٘دبذ ، ًٔب ٣٘جـ٢ إٔ رٞاكن اُِد٘خ ػِ٠ ٓٞخٞظح  اُطبيخ ث٘ظْ اُؽهبثخ اُعاضِ٤خ ثّا٣دت إٔ رزؤًع اُِد٘خ ٖٓ إٔ اُُٞ 1-6
 .اُج٤بٗبد اُٞاؼظح ك٢ اُزوؽ٣ؽ اُك٘ٞ١ ثبُ٘كجخ ُِؽهبثخ اُعاضِ٤خ ٝإظاؼح أُطبْؽ
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ػٖ روبؼ٣ؽ  ٝظػْ إػعاظرزؼِن ثبُوٞائْ أُبُ٤خ، رو٤٤ْ أُطبْؽ  ٝٓكبئَ، اُؽهبث٤خ ثبُهؽًخ الأٗظٔخ أُؽاخؼخخ٘خ ٣٘جـ٢ إٔ رعؼـ ٍ 2-6
 .روؽ٣ؽ اُك٘ٞ١اٍك٢ ُِهؽًخ  اُؽهبثخ اُعاضِ٤خ
     
ك٢  اُكِٞىُوٞاػع اُؽهبثخ اُعاضِ٤خ إَبكًخ ُِو٤بّ ثبُٔؽاخؼخ اُك٘ٞ٣خ  َٞاثّإٔ رؽظع الإظاؼح ػٖ ردبٝؾ  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخػِ٠  3-6
 .اُهؽًخ
     
ثلاؽ ك٠ ضلاٍ ٣ّٞ ػَٔ ٝازع كوّ إ ٓدِف الإظاؼح ٝػِ٠. اُسكبثبد هتٓؽاػٖ اُـم ٖٓ هجَ  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ اثلاؽ٣دت إٔ ٣زْ  4-6
ثسٍِٞ  ُٜ٤ئخ اُؼبٓخ ُِؽهبثخ أُبُ٤خا إٔ ٣جِؾ ٓؽاهت اُسكبثبد كٞؼ ػِٔٚث٤٘ٔب ٣زٞخت ػِ٠ ثػُي  ُٜ٤ئخ اُؼبٓخ ُِؽهبثخ أُبُ٤خا
 .ٜٗب٣خ ٣ّٞ اُؼَٔ اُزبُ٢
     
 الإبلاغ المباشر عن الغش والتلاعب .7
َٛ رؼزوع إٔ إَبكخ ا ُج٘ٞظ ا ُزبُ٤خ قٞف ٣كبػع ا ُِد٘خ ػِ٠ ا ُزؼبَٓ ٓغ اُهٌبٟٝ ػِ٠ ٗسٞ أًثؽ كؼبُ٤خ؟ 
ثٔؽاخؼخ أ١ نٌٟٞ قٞاء ًبٗذ  اُكٔبذ ُِؼبِٓ٤ٖ ثبلإثلاؽ ثًٞؼح ٓجبنؽح ػٖ اُـم ٝاُزلاػتٌَِٓؿٓخ ٖٓ ضلاٍ  خ٘خ أُؽاخؼخ ٍ1-7
 .اُعاضِ٤خ ٝاُوٞائْ أُبُ٤خ ُِهؽًخاُؽهبثخ ث٘ظْ ٖٓ ظاضَ أٝ ضبؼج اُهؽًخ ٓزؼِوخ  ٓوعٓخ
     
 خ٘خ أُؽاخؼخأػُبء ٍة ضبيخأُؼِٞٓبد اٍ اُزؼؽف ػِ٠إٔ ٣ٌٕٞ هبظؼًا ػِ٠  ًٟٞ٣دت ػِ٠ ًَ نطى ٣ؽؿت ثبلإثلاؽ ػٖ ل 2-7
قُٜٞخ إرجبع ٝ ُٓٔٞٗخقؽ٣خ أُهزٌ٢  ٓغ ٓؽاػبح إٔ رٌٕٞ أٝ الارًبٍ ثبُطّ اُكبضٖ ٓٞهغ اُهؽًخ ػِ٠ الاٗزؽٗذك٢ 
 . ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخاُزؼِ٤ٔبد أَُٞٞػخ ٖٓ هجَ 
     
ػَٔ ٓؼ٤ٖ ٌُبَٓ رجبع ٓكبؼ إرٞي٤خ ةاٍرًس٤س٤خ أٝ اٍخؽاءاد الإرسعظ ثئخؽاء اُزسو٤ن قٞف  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخػ٘عٓب روّٞ  3-7
  .خِف الإظاؼحأػُبء ّ
     
 ةالذاخلي لمراجعتادور  .8
 ؟اُعاضِ٤٤ٖ ٓؽاخؼ٤ٍٖاػِ٠  ػبُخاُؽهبثخ اُق ك٢َٛ رؼزوع إٔ إَبكخ ا ُج٘ٞظ ا ُزبُ٤خ قٞف ٣كبػع ا ُِد٘خ 
ُد٘خ روع٣ْ اُزوبؼ٣ؽ إُ٠  ٖٓ ضلاٍ ٓغ ؼئ٤ف ٝأػُبء ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ ٣٘جـ٢ إٔ ٣ٌٕٞ ُٚ ػلاهخ ٓجبنؽح اُعاضِ٢  ؼاخغاُْ 1-8
 . ٓؽاخؼخؼئ٤ف هكْ اٍ خعٍٝ أػٔبٍ ُِك٘خ اُوبظٓخ أٝ أُٞاكوخ ػِ٠ خعٍٝ أػٔبٍَٝغ ٓٔب ق٤كبػع ػِ٠  أُؽاخؼخ
     
      .ثبُهؽًخ اُؽهبثخ اُعاضِ٤خرٞك٤ؽ َٔبٗخ َٓٞٞػ٤خ ػٖ ًلبءح  ؼاخغ اُعاضِ٢ق٤كزٓ٤غ اُْ ًبك٤خؼ ٓٞاؼظ ١ػ٘ع رٞف 2-8
اُؽهبثخ أُبُ٤خ  اُطّٓ أٛعاف إٔ رؼٌف رِي٣خ ًٝ٤ق أُؽاخؼخ اُعاضِ٤خٓؽاخؼخ ضّٓ ٝ ٓ٤ؿاٗ٤خ  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخػِ٠  ٣٘جـ٢ 3-8
 .ٓؽاهت اُسكبثبد ثبُهؽًخ ٝٓزِٓجبد
     
      ٓدٜؿ ردٜ٤ؿًا ٝإ اُوكْ ُِٔؽاخؼخ اُعاضِ٤خ اُٞيٍٞ إُ٠ أُؼِٞٓبدٝإٌٓبٗ٤خ ٓٞاؼظ اٍ كؽارٞ٣٘جـ٢ إٔ رُٖٔ  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ 4-8
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 .ًبًٓلا
ك٢ ٓثَ ٌٛػا  َِٓغ ثٜٔبّ ؼهبث٤خ إَبك٤خرٌِلخ إٗٔب ٣دت إٔ درؽن٤ع إًٍٞ اُُس٤خ ك٢ أٝهبد د ٣دت إٔ لا أُؽاخؼخ اُعاضِ٤خ 5-8
 .ظؽٝف
     
خ٘خ ػِ٠ ٍٝ ق٘ٞاد 5ٓؽاخؼخ اُعاضِ٤خ ػِ٠ الأهَ ًَ ٣دت ػِ٠ اُهؽًخ إٔ روّٞ ثزلؼ٤َ ثؽٗبٓح َٔبٕ اُدٞظح ٝاُزٓٞ٣ؽ ُوكْ اٍ 6-8
 .أُؽاخؼخ اُعاضِ٤خُٔ٘بههخ أظاء ؼئ٤ف هكْ  ٝٓؽاهت اُسكبثبداُز٘ل٤ػ٣٤ٖ ُٔع٣ؽ٣ٖ إٔ ردزٔغ ق٘ٞ٣ًب ٓغ ا أُؽاخؼخ
     
ٝإ اُلؽ٣ن ٓكئٍٞ  الإظاؼح ؿ٤ؽ اُز٘ل٤ػ١ٓدِف إرًبٍ ٓجبنؽ ٓغ ؼئ٤ف  أُؽاخؼخ اُعاضِ٤خإٔ ُلؽ٣ن  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخرُٖٔ  7-8
 .ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخأٓبّ  ٓجبنؽًح
     
 مراقب الحساباث .9
 ؟ك٢ الإقزؼبٗخ ثٔؽاهج٢ زكبثبد أكَُ ٝأزكٖ رؤٛ٤ًلاَٛ رؼزوع إٔ إَبكخ ا ُج٘ٞظ ا ُزبُ٤خ قٞف ٣كبػع ا ُِد٘خ 
ٝاُؼوع ٣٘جـ٢ إٔ ٣ؤًع ػِ٠ إٕ اُؼٔ٤َ ٛٞ  اُسكبثبد اُطبؼخ٢ هتٓغ ٓؽا نؽًخاٍ حاُِد٘خ ٛ٢ أُكؤُٝخ ػٖ الإنؽاف ػِ٠ ػلام 1-9
 .خ٘خ أُؽاخؼخٓكئٍٞ أٓبّ ٍ اُسكبثبد هتٓؽاُػُي ف ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ
     
الاػزجبؼ اُسبخخ إُ٠ رُٔ٤ٖ ٓطبْؽ رؽى  ػ٤ٖإٔ رسون ك٢ أَُٞٞع أضػح ة ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخكؼِ٠  اُسكبثبد هتٓؽاإغا إقزوبٍ  2-9
 .اُطبيخ ث٘هبِ اُهؽًخ ُِٔطبْؽ رو٤٤ٔٚٓؽاهت اُسكبثبد ُِؼَٔ ك٢ ػِٔ٤خ 
     
اُسكبثبد  ٓؽاهت الاقزـ٘بء ػٖهعّ روؽ٣ؽا إُ٠ أُكبٛٔ٤ٖ ثهؤٕ اُزؼ٤٤ٖ ٝإػبظح اُزؼ٤٤ٖ أٝ دإٔ  ػِ٠ ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ٣٘جـ٢  3-9
 .غُي ك٢ اُزوؽ٣ؽ اُك٘ٞ١ أقجبة ٣٘جـ٢ اٌُهق ػٖف، ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ إغا ًبٕ أُدِف لا ٣وجَ رٞي٤خأٓب   .اُطبؼخ٢
     
      .ظٝؼ١ ثٔؽاخؼخ اُؼوع ٓغ اُهؽ٣ي اُز٘ل٤ػ١ ُٔؽاهت اُسكبثبد ػ٘ع ثعا٣خ ًَ رعه٤ن خ٘خ أُؽاخؼخ٣دت إٔ روّٞ ٍ 4-9
أُؽاخؼخ ٝػٔب إغا ًبٗذ أرؼبة  ٓؽاهت اُسكبثبدإٔ رؤضػ ثؼ٤ٖ الاػزجبؼ ٓؤٛلاد  ػِ٤ٜب ٣٘جـ٢ثبُزو٤٤ْ  خ٘خ أُؽاخؼخػ٘ع ه٤بّ ٍ 5-9
   .اُزؼو٤ع ٝٓٞايلبد اُؽهبثخ ك٢ اُهؽًخ ّ ٓغ اُسدْ، أُطبْؽ،ءرزلا اُطبؼخ٤خ
     
، الإقزلكبؼاد اُسٌٞٓ٤خ أٝ ا٣خ ٓؽاهت اُسكبثبدإٔ رؽاخغ ق٘ٞ٣ًب خٞظح اُؽهبثخ اُعاضِ٤خ، رو٤٤ْ  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ٣دت ػِ٠  6-9
 . ٓٞؼ ٝاُطبيخ ثٔؽاهت زكبثبرٜبالأ رِيغد ُِزؼبَٓ ٓغ ِشٌدإضٓٞاد 
     
ق٘ٞاد ٖٝٓ ثْ  5هع رْ كؼًلا ثؼع ٓؽٝؼ  ٌٓزت ٓؽاهت اُسكبثبدٖٓ إٔ اُز٘بٝة الإُؿآ٢ ُٔع٣ؽ ٝنؽًبء  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخرزؤًع  7-9
 .ثطلاف أػٔبٍ أُؽاخؼخْجن ػِ٠ اُطعٓبد ٕٗلف اُه٢ء ١. ق٘ٞاد 5إضُبػْٜ ُِٜٔخ 
     
ك٢ رؼ٤٤ٖ أُٞظل٤ٖ اُكبثو٤ٖ ُٔؽاهت اُسكبثبد ٝاُػ٣ٖ ًبٗٞا ك٢  ٓدِف الإظاؼحإٔ رزٞاكن ٓغ ق٤بقخ  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ٣٘جـ٢ ػِ٠  8-9
 .ٝاٗزوِٞا ٓجبنؽح إُ٠ اُهؽًخ أُؽاخؼخكؽ٣ن 
     
٣ٔف إقزولاُ٤خ ٓؽاهت اُسكبثبد  لا ث٘ع اُطعٓبد ثطلاف أػٔبٍ أُؽاخؼخ إٔ روؽ٣ؽ اُك٘ٞ١اٍك٢  خ٘خ أُؽاخؼخ٣دت إٔ رؤًع ٍ 9-9
     . خ٘خ أُؽاخؼخثهؽِ ٓٞاكوخ ٍ ُٔؽاهت اُسكبثبدٖٓ إخٔبُ٢ أُجِؾ أُعكٞع % 5٣زدبٝؾ  ٝ٣دت إٔ لا
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اُزؤٓ٤ٖ  ، ٓثَٓؽاخؼخك٢ ٗلف اُٞهذ ٓغ ػِٔ٤خ اٍ ٓؽاخؼخروع٣ْ ضعٓبد ٓؼ٤٘خ ؿ٤ؽ اٍ ٓز٘غ ػٖاُسكبثبد ٣٘جـ٢ إٔ ١ هتٓؽا 01-9
  .اُص...ٝأُٞاؼظ اُجهؽ٣خ
     
 الحساباث مراجعتالذورة السنىيت ل .01
 ؟ثؼِٔ٤خ ٓؽاخؼخ أًثؽ ًلبءحاُو٤بّ َٛ رؼزوع إٔ إَبكخ ا ُج٘ٞظ ا ُزبُ٤خ قٞف ٣كبػع ا ُِد٘خ ػِ٠ 
ٓؽاخؼخ الإػزجبؼ ك٤ٔب إغا ًبٗذ ضٓخ ػَٔ ٓؽاهت اُسكبثبد رزكن ٓغ ٗٓبم ٜٓبّ  ػ٤ٖإٔ رؤضػ ة ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ٣دت ػِ٠  1-01
 .اُسكبثبد
     
ُُٔبٕ  حاُعاضِ٢ أُؽاخؼخٓغ ًَ ٖٓ ٓؽاهت اُسكبثبد، أُع٣ؽ أُبُ٢ ٝٓع٣ؽ  اُطبؼخ٤خ ٓؽاخؼخٓؽاخؼخ ضٓخ ٝٗٓبم اٍ 2-01
 .اُدٜٞظ ؿ٤ؽ اُُؽٝؼ٣خ ضل٤ٍد
     
زٍٞ ٗٞػ٤خ ُٝ٤ف كوّ قلآخ أُجبظ١ء  خ٘خ أُؽاخؼخٓؽاهت اُسكبثبد ثبُسًٍٞ ػِ٠ ؼأ١ ٍ٣دت إٔ ٣ٌٕٞ ٛ٘بى ظُ٤َ ٣ٍُِؿّ  3-01
 .أُسبقج٤خ أُكزطعٓخ ك٢ اُهؽًخ
     
قٞاء ًبٗذ  ُز٢ رْ ٓؽاخؼزٜبلإقزؼؽاٌ اُوٞائْ أُبُ٤خ ا ٝٓؽاهت اُسكبثبد إٔ ردزٔغ ٓغ الإظاؼح خ٘خ أُؽاخؼخػِ٠ ٍ 4-01
 .كًِ٤خ اّ ق٘ٞ٣خ
     
الإظاؼح، ًٝػُي ٓؽاخؼخ ضٓبة  هجَ ٓؽاخؼخ ضٓبة ٓؽاهت اُسكبثبد هجَ أًُبظهخ ػِ٤ٚ ٖٓ أُؽاخؼخ خ٘خ٣دت ػِ٠ ٍ 5-01
 .الإظاؼح ػِ٠ رِي اُزٞي٤بد ؼظالإظاؼح ٓزًُٔ٘ب رٞي٤بد ٓؽاهت اُسكبثبد ٝ
     
٣دت إٔ ركزؼؽٌ ك٤ٔب إغا ، ٓؽاخؼخثزو٤٤ْ كؼبُ٤خ ػِٔ٤خ اٍ خ٘خ أُؽاخؼخروّٞ ٍ  اُسكبثبد ٓؽاخؼخك٢ ٜٗب٣خ اُعٝؼح اُك٘ٞ٣خ ٍ 6-01
اُز٘ل٤ػ٣٤ٖ غٝ١ اُؼلاهخ زٍٞ كبػِ٤خ  ظ٣ؽ٣ٖ، ٣زْ اُسًٍٞ ػِ٠ ٓلازظبد أُُْؽاخؼخًبٕ ٓؽاهت اُسكبثبد هع أٝك٠ ثطٓخ ا
 .ٓؽاخؼخػِٔ٤خ اٍ
     
 ٓغ خٞٛؽ٣خٝأ١ ضلاكبد  ٓؽاخؼخػِٔ٤خ اٍ ضلاٍ أ٣خ يؼٞثبد ٝاخٜزٚ ٓؽاهت اُسكبثبدر٘بهم ٓغ  إٔ٣دت  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ 7-01
  .أُبُ٤خ هٞائَْٔبٕ زَ اُطلاكبد ثهؤٕ اٍٍالإظاؼح 
     
 العلاقت بالمساهمين .11
 ُٞكبء ثٜب؟ٍرؼبهع ٓؼٜب  غ١رسو٤ن أٛعاف أُدِف اٍَٛ رؼزوع إٔ إَبكخ ا ُج٘ٞظ ا ُزبُ٤خ قٞف ٣كبػع ا ُِد٘خ ػِ٠ 
إغا ًبٗذ هع أٝكذ ثبُزؿآبرٜب ك٢ ر٘ل٤ػ أُ٤ثبم ٝاُػ١ ٣دت إ ٣ؽكن روؽ٣ؽٛب اُك٘ٞ١ ك٢  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ٣٘جـ٢ إٔ رَٞر  1-11
اًُلاز٤خ اٌُبِٓخ ثطًٞو الإكًبذ ػٖ ٛػٙ  ٛ٤ئخ اُؼبٓخ ُِؽهبثخ أُبُ٤خ٣دت إٔ رٌٕٞ َُ. ق٘ٞاد 3ًَ ١ روؽ٣ؽ اُك٘ٞآٍغ 
 .أُؼِٞٓبد ُِؼبٓخ
     
     ػعظ الإخزٔبػبد، ِٓطى ُعٝؼ اُِد٘خ، : ٝرزُٖٔروؽ٣ؽٛب اُك٘ٞ١ ٓزبزخ ك٢  ُد٘خ أُؽاخؼخ٣دت إٔ رٌٕٞ إضزًبيبد  2-11
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 .اُص...
أػٔبٍ ٝأٗهٓخ ُد٘خ زٍٞ  أقئِخُِؽظ ػِ٠ أ١  ُِدٔؼ٤خ اُؼبٓخ ُِٔكبٛٔ٤ٖ الاخزٔبع اُك٘ٞ١ ٣دت إٔ ٣سُؽؼئ٤ف اُِد٘خ  3-11
 .أُؽاخؼخ
     
رؼ٤٤ٖ  )إٕ ٝخع(الإظاؼح  ٓدِفٓغ ضلاف اُِد٘خ ةأُزؼِوخ ًَب ًزِي أ١نَٔ ٓكبئَ أضؽٟ ١ ٣٘جـ٢ إٔ روؽ٣ؽ اُِد٘خ اُك٘ٞ١ 4-11
 .زكبثبداٍ ؼاهتٓغ ّ أُؽرجٓخ ثؼلاهخ اُِد٘خ الأضؽٟٝثؼٍ أُكبئَ  أػٔبٍ أُؽاخؼخرٞك٤ؽ ضعٓبد ؿ٤ؽ ، اُسكبثبد هتٓؽا
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1
 Audit Committee 
2
 Board of Directors 
Description Strongly Agree 
Agree Don’t 
Know 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1. Establishment & Role 
Do you think adding the following provisions will help in building a more sustainable AC 1?  
1-1 AC members appointed by BD2 on the recommendation of the Nomination 
Committee in consultation with AC Chairman 
     
1-2 AC member appointment should be for 3 years and extendable by no more than 
another two periods 
     
1-3 If any AC member serves in more than 3 listed companies the BD should decide that 
this situation will not impair the ability of such AC 
     
1-4 Each member of AC should be responsible to announce any potential conflict of 
interest in advance 
     
1-5 There should be sufficient time between AC meetings and BD meetings to allow 
actions to be carried out 
     
1-6 AC Meeting discussions should be documented and circulated to internal and 
external auditors as appropriate 
     
 
2. Resources 
Do you think adding the following provisions will provide sufficient fund to the AC to perform its duties?  
2-1 The AC should be supplied with adequate resources to undertake its duties      
2-2 Hiring independent counsel and other advisers to help the AC as necessary      
2-3 level of Salary rewarded to AC members should take into account the extra 
responsibilities, skills, duties and time brought in. Therefore, AC members could get 
more Salary than BD members could 
 
     
 
3. Skills & Experience 
Do you think adding the following provisions will improve the performance of committee? 
3-1 AC Financial Expert should have a professional qualification not only an accounting 
experience to be hired by BD  
     
3-2 AC members training should be on a timely and ongoing basis and related to      
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company bylaws with focus on new AC members 
3-3 Companies must have AC members financially literate or will become financially literate 
within a reasonable time after their appointment 
     
 
4. Audit Committee Relation with Board of Directors  
Do you think adding the following provisions will help the board and the committee to work more efficiently with each other’s? 
4-1 AC chairman should report formally to the BD on its proceedings after each meeting. 
The AC is an integral part of the corporate framework in helping to fulfill the BD’s 
stewardship responsibility to its outside stakeholders  
     
4-2 AC get formal Terms of Reference by the BD which should be reviewed annually by 
BD 
     
4-3 Disagreement between AC and BD should have enough time to be solved, if not; AC 
should report the issue to the shareholders 
     
4-4 The AC must have a written charter that includes: annual performance evaluation, 
the purpose, Etc. and the charter must be posted on the company’s website  
     
 
5. Financial Reporting  
Do you think adding the following provisions will improve the disclosure of the company?  
5-1 AC should review related information to financial statements first because BD’s 
approval is required 
     
5-2 If AC is not satisfied with any aspect of the proposed financial reporting, by the 
management, it shall report it to BD 
     
 
6. Internal Control  
Do you think adding the following provisions will help the committee to fight fraud more effectively?  
6-1 The AC needs to be confident that the controls are in place and operating 
successfully, also AC should approve the statements in the annual report in relation 
to internal control and the management of risk  
     
6-2 AC should examine company’s control systems, issues relate to the company’s 
financial statements, assess risk profile and support preparation of statement on 
internal control in the annual report 
     
6-3 AC should deter management override of internal controls and review annually the 
organization’s code of conduct 
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3
 Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority. 
4
 Chief Audit Executive  
5
 Internal Audit Function 
6-4 Fraud must be reported to the AC by the CPA firm. The BD has one business day to 
notify the EFSA3, while the CPA firm is required to report to the EFSA by the end of 
the next business day 
     
 
7. Whistle-Blowing 
Do you think adding the following provisions will help the committee to handle complaints more effectively?  
7-1 AC is required by Whistle-Blowing to review any complaints received whether 
generated internally or externally, regarding internal controls and financial 
statements 
     
7-2 If anyone wants to complain s/he should find the contact information of AC members 
on company’s website or call the hotline. Confidentiality of the employee should be 
guaranteed. The complainer should be able to follow the procedures the AC has 
established 
     
7-3 When performing an investigation the AC will determine the corrective action or 
recommend a course of actions to the full BD 
     
 
8. Internal Audit Function 
Do you think adding the following provisions will help the committee to effectively monitor the internal auditors?  
8-1 The internal audit function should have a direct reporting relationship to the AC which 
helps creating an agenda for the coming year or approve CAE’s4 agenda 
     
8-2 Adequately resourced internal audit function may provide the BD with an objective 
assurance on the internal control 
     
8-3 AC should review IAF5 budget and plans and how such plans reflect CPA firm’s 
objectives 
     
8-4 The AC should guarantee that the IAF has resources and access to information and 
is fully equipped 
     
8-5 In times of cutting costs, the IAF should not be the victim; in fact, it should be doing 
extra monitoring 
     
8-6 Companies should perform an internal Improvement and Quality Assurance Program 
minimally once every 5 years  for IAF. AC should meet annually with executive 
managers and CPA firm to discuss the performance of CAE 
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8-7 The AC ensures that internal auditor team has direct access to the BD’s chairman 
and accountable to the AC 
     
 
9. External Audit  
Do you think adding the following provisions would help Audit Committees to hire better and more qualified Auditors?  
9-1 AC is responsible for overseeing organization’s relations with the CPA firm and 
engagement letter should state that the client is the AC, so the CPA firm is 
accountable to the AC 
     
9-2 If the CPA firm resigned, the AC should investigate and should consider the need to 
include the risk of the departure of their CPA firm in their risk evaluation 
     
9-3 The AC should report to shareholders on the appointment, reappointment or removal 
of the CPA firm. If the BD does not accept AC’s recommendation, this should be 
disclosed in the annual report 
     
9-4 AC should review the engagement letter with the executive partner at the start of 
each audit 
     
9-5 AC evaluation should take into consideration the CPA firm’s qualifications and 
whether the audit fee is proper to the size, risk, complexity and control profile of the 
company 
     
9-6 Annually AC reviews CPA firm’s internal quali ty control, peer review, governmental 
inquires or any step taken to deal with such issues  
     
9-7 AC makes sure of the mandatory rotation took place by the CPA firm to the lead and 
other partners after five years and then subject them to a five-year time-out. The 
same thing also applies for non-audit service 
     
9-8 The AC should agree with the BD's policy for the employment of former employees 
of the CPA firm who were part of the audit team and moved directly to the 
organization 
     
9-9 AC should state in the annual report that the provision of non-audit services does not 
harm the CPA firm’s independence and should not be more than 5% of total amount 
paid to the CPA firm only if AC approves it  
     
9-10 CPA firms should be prohibited from providing certain non-audit services at the 
same time with the audit, like actuarial services, HR, etc...  
     
 
10. Annual Audit Cycle  
Do you think adding the following provisions would help Audit Committees in delivering more efficient audit process? 
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6
 Chief Financial Officer 
10-1 The AC should consider whether the CPA firm’s overall work plan is consistent with 
the scope of the audit engagement 
     
10-2 Review with the CPA firm, CFO6 and CAE, the audit plan and scope of the IAF team 
to assure the reduction of unnecessary efforts  
     
10-3 There should be a guidance necessitating that CPA firm gets from ACs their opinion 
of the quality, not just the acceptability, of the accounting principles used in the 
company 
     
10-4 AC must meet with management and the CPA firm to review audited quarterly and 
annual financial statements 
     
10-5 AC should review the CPA firm representation letters before signature by 
management, also review management letters including the recommendations of 
CPA firm and management’s responses to those recommendations  
     
10-6 At the end of the annual audit cycle, the AC assesses the effectiveness of the audit 
process, it should review whether CPA firm has met its audit plan and obtain 
feedback about the performance of the audit from key executives involved  
     
10-7 AC should discuss with the CPA firm any difficulties faced during the audit cycle and 
any major disagreements with management and ensure solution of disagreements 
regarding financial reporting 
     
 
11. Communication with Shareholders 
Do you think adding the following provisions would help the committee to achieve the objectives that the board hire them to f ulfill? 
11-1 The AC should disclose in the annual report whether satisfied its responsibilities in 
fulfilling the charter which should be attached to the annual report every 3 years. The 
EFSA should have jurisdiction over reporting of information to the public 
     
11-2 The terms of reference of the AC should be made available in the annual report 
and should include; number of AC meetings, summary of AC role, etc...  
     
11-3 Chairman of AC will be available at the Annual General Meeting to answer any 
question about AC 
     
11-4 The annual report should include other matters concerning the disagreement 
between AC & BD, the issue of appointing the CPA firm, provision of non-audit 
services and certain matters with CPA firm 
     
